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A sensor is a battery-operated small computer with an antenna and a
sensing board that can sense magnetism, sound, heat, etc. Sensors in a net-
work communicate and cooperate with other sensors to perform given tasks.
A sensor network is exposed to various dynamic factors and faults, such as
topology changes, energy saving features, unreliable communication, and hard-
ware/software failures. Thus, protocols in this sensor network should be able
to adapt to dynamic factors and recover from faults.
In this dissertation, we focus on designing and analyzing a class of
sensor network protocols, called self-stabilizing protocols. A self-stabilizing
protocol is guaranteed to return to a state where it performs its intended
function correctly, when some dynamic factors or faults corrupt the state of
the protocol arbitrarily. Therefore, in order to make a sensor network resilient
vi
to dynamic factors and faults, each protocol in the sensor network should be
self-stabilizing.
We first develop a state-based model that can be used to formally spec-
ify sensor network protocols. This model accommodates several unique char-
acteristics of sensor networks, such as unavoidable local broadcast, probabilis-
tic message transmission, asymmetric communication, message collision, and
timeout actions and randomization steps. Second, we present analysis methods
for verifying and analyzing the correctness and self-stabilization properties of
sensor network protocols specified in this model. Third, using the state-based
model and analysis methods, we design three self-stabilizing sensor network
protocols, prove their self-stabilization properties, and estimate their perfor-
mance. These three self-stabilizing protocols are a sentry-sleeper protocol that
elects a sentry from a group of sensors at the beginning of each time period, a
logical grid routing protocol that builds a routing tree whose root is the base
station, and a family of flood sequencing protocols that distinguish between
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A sensor is a battery-operated small computer with an antenna and a
sensing board that can sense magnetism, sound, heat, etc. Sensors in a network
can use their antennas to communicate in a wireless fashion by broadcasting
messages over radio frequency to neighboring sensors in the network. Due
to the limited range of radio transmission, sensor networks are usually multi-
hop. Sensor networks can be used for military, environmental, and commer-
cial applications such as intrusion detection [4, 7], habitat monitoring [49, 75],
micro-climatic monitoring [66], and equipment health monitoring [42].
A sensor network is exposed to various dynamic factors and faults,
such as topology changes, energy saving features, unreliable communication,
and hardware/software failures. These dynamic factors and faults can cause
a protocol executed in the network to reach an illegitimate state, where the
protocol cannot perform its intended function correctly. A protocol is called
self-stabilizing if starting from any illegitimate state, the protocol eventually
converges to a legitimate state, and once it reaches a legitimate state, it con-
tinues to perform its intended function correctly [5, 23]. Therefore, in order to
make a sensor network resilient to dynamic factors and faults, each protocol
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in the network should be self-stabilizing.
A self-stabilizing protocol provides a high degree of fault-tolerance for
transient faults that can corrupt the state of the protocol arbitrarily. Examples
of transient faults in a sensor network are memory corruption, message cor-
ruption, and sensor failure and recovery. We assume that these faults do not
continuously occur in the network. A self-stabilizing sensor network protocol
recovers from these transient faults without any manual intervention.
Developing self-stabilizing sensor network protocols is a challenging
task, since sensor networks have several unique characteristics, such as un-
avoidable local broadcast, probabilistic message transmission, asymmetric com-
munication, message collision, and timeout actions and randomization steps.
These characteristics should be taken into account when one designs or ana-
lyzes self-stabilizing sensor network protocols.
Self-stabilization has been studied in the literature of distributed sys-
tems [5, 6, 21, 23, 58]. However, the models used in the literature (such as
shared memory models) do not accommodate the unique characteristics and
specific behaviors of sensor networks. Thus, self-stabilizing protocols that are
developed based on these models are not suitable for sensor networks.
Several self-stabilizing sensor network protocols have been developed
based on abstract models. In these models, communications between sensors
are abstracted via shared variables [19], and message channels [12, 20], which,
we believe, are not suitable for designing and analyzing sensor network proto-
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cols.
There have been some efforts on transformations of self-stabilizing pro-
tocols from the models of distributed systems to a sensor network model, where
local broadcast and message collision are taken into account in shaping the ex-
ecution of sensor networks [34, 43]. However, these models assume symmetric
communications between sensors, and do not consider probabilistic message
transmission, and timeout actions and randomization steps, which are very
common in practical sensor networks.
1.1 Contributions
In this dissertation, we focus on designing and analyzing self-stabilizing
sensor network protocols. This dissertation has three major contributions
as follows. First, we develop a state-based model that can be used to for-
mally specify sensor network protocols (in short, sensor protocols). Second,
we present analysis methods for verifying and analyzing the correctness and
self-stabilization properties of sensor protocols specified in this model. Third,
we design and analyze several self-stabilizing sensor protocols that play critical
roles in sensor networks. For each of these protocols, the protocol is formally
specified using our state-based model, and the self-stabilization properties of
the protocol and its performance are verified and analyzed using our analysis
methods. Next, we discuss each of our contributions in detail.
3
1.1.1 A State-based Model of Sensor Protocols
The unique characteristics of sensor networks, such as unavoidable lo-
cal broadcast, probabilistic message transmission, asymmetric communication,
message collision, and timeout actions and randomization steps, make sensor
protocols hard to specify formally and even harder to verify or analyze. More-
over, these characteristics distinguish sensor networks from other distributed
systems, and make existing models for distributed systems unsuitable for sen-
sor networks. As a result, in most previous work, sensor protocols have been
developed and implemented without formal descriptions of the protocols, and
usually tested by simulation, which cannot guarantee the correctness of the
protocols.
To solve these problems, we develop a state-based model of sensor pro-
tocols, which accommodates the above characteristics of sensor networks [27].
This model allows us to formally specify and verify the desired properties of
sensor protocols, and also allows us to develop the simulation of the protocols
so that we can estimate their performance.
1.1.2 Analysis Methods of Sensor Protocols
The model of sensor protocols presented in this dissertation is rather
detailed. Thus, we propose three methods for analyzing a sensor protocol
specification based on this model [27].
In the first method, called nondeterministic analysis, a specified sensor
protocol is shown to be “nondeterministically correct” under the assumption
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that message delivery is assured and message collision is guaranteed not to
occur. In the second method, called probabilistic analysis, the protocol is
shown to be “probabilistically correct” under the assumption that message
delivery is probabilistic but message collision is guaranteed not to occur. In
the third method, called collision analysis, the effect of message collision and
probabilistic message delivery on the correctness of the protocol is analyzed,
and appropriate values for some parameters in the protocol are chosen to
achieve a compromise between two conflicting factors: make the probability of
message collision reasonably small, and make the protocol reach a target state
within a reasonably short time.
To demonstrate the utility of our model and analysis methods, we dis-
cuss an example protocol that can be used by a sensor to identify its strong
neighbors in the network, and apply the three analysis methods, mentioned
above, to the protocol to analyze its correctness.
1.1.3 Sentries and Sleepers in Sensor Networks
One of the challenging problems in designing sensor networks is to
lengthen the lifetime of sensor batteries. To solve this problem, we can replace
each sensor in a network with a group of sensors and make the group of sensors
act as one sensor.
We present a sentry-sleeper protocol that elects one sensor from a group
of sensors at the beginning of each time period [28]. This protocol can be used
to lengthen the lifetime of the group by making the elected sensor, called
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a sentry, stay awake and the other sensors, called sleepers, go to sleep. This
protocol is self-stabilizing such that starting from any state, the protocol even-
tually converges to a legitimate state where exactly one sensor in the group is
a sentry. We show by analysis and simulation that by adopting this protocol,
a group of n sensors can lengthen its lifetime almost n times the lifetime of a
single sensor. This protocol does not require sensors in a group to have unique
identifiers. This feature makes our protocol resilient against any attack by
an adversary sensor in the group that may lie about its own identifier to be
elected a sentry over and over, and keep the legitimate sensors in the group
asleep for a long time.
1.1.4 Logical Grid Routing in Sensor Networks
It is difficult to design a routing protocol for sensor networks, since such
a protocol should overcome the special challenges of sensor networks. First, the
protocol should not consume a large fraction of the network resources. Second,
the protocol should be able to recover from various faults such as memory
corruption, and sensor failure and recovery. Third, the protocol should avoid
unreliable long links in sensor networks that prevent building a reliable routing
tree.
We develop a routing protocol, called the logical grid routing protocol,
that builds an incoming spanning tree whose root is the base station of a sensor
network [17]. This routing protocol is stabilizing such that starting from any
state, the protocol converges to a legitimate state where all the sensors that can
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be connected to the routing tree are connected to the tree. The convergence
time of the protocol is proportional to the diameter of the sensor network.
This routing protocol also has several other advantages over earlier protocols:
overhead of the protocol is small, the protocol avoids unreliable long links to
build a reliable routing tree, the protocol balances the load over the whole
network, and it has nice fault-tolerance property. We show by experiments
that this protocol provides reliable message delivery to the base station under
heavy and bursty traffic.
1.1.5 Flood Sequencing Protocols in Sensor Networks
Flood is a communication primitive that can be used by the base station
of a sensor network to send a copy of a message to every sensor in the network.
When a sensor receives a flood message, the sensor needs to check whether it
has received this message for the first time or not. If the sensor has received
this message for the first time, the message is fresh, and so the sensor accepts
it and may forward it to its neighbors. Otherwise, the message is redundant
and so the sensor discards it. We call a protocol that uses sequence numbers
to distinguish between fresh and redundant flood messages a flood sequencing
protocol. A flood sequencing protocol should be designed such that when some
fault corrupts the state of the protocol arbitrarily, the protocol eventually
converges to a legitimate state where every sensor accepts every fresh message
and discards every redundant message.
We discuss a family of four flood sequencing protocols. They are a
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sequencing free protocol, a linear sequencing protocol, a circular sequencing
protocol, and a differentiated sequencing protocol. We also analyze the sta-
bilization properties of these four protocols, and compare them against each
other. We conclude that the differentiated sequencing protocol has better sta-
bilization property and provides better performance than those of the other
three protocols.
1.2 Organization
The organization of this dissertation is as follows. In Chapter 2, we
introduce a state-based model of sensor network protocols. In Chapter 3, we
present three analysis methods for sensor network protocols. In the following
three chapters, we specify and analyze three self-stabilizing sensor network
protocols. In Chapter 4, a sentry-sleeper protocol is discussed. In Chapter 5,
a logical grid routing protocol is presented. In Chapter 6, a family of flood




A State-based Model of Sensor Protocols
Sensor networks and their protocols have several characteristics that
make them hard to specify formally and even harder to verify. Examples of
these characteristics are
i. Unavoidable local broadcast: When a sensor sends a message, even one
that is intended for a particular neighboring sensor, a copy of the message
is received by every neighboring sensor.
ii. Probabilistic message transmission: When a sensor sends a message, the
message reaches the different neighboring sensors (and can be received
by each of them) with different probabilities.
iii. Asymmetric communication: Let u and v be two neighboring sensors in
a network. The probability that a message sent by u is received by v can
be different from the probability that a message sent by v is received by
u.
iv. Message collision: If two neighboring sensors send messages at the same
time, then neither sensor receives the message from the other sensor.
Moreover, if two (not necessarily neighboring) sensors send messages at
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the same time, then any sensor that is a neighbor of both sensors will
not receive any of the two messages. In this case, the two messages are
said to have collided.
v. Timeout actions and randomization steps: Given the above characteris-
tics of a sensor network, it seems logical that sensor protocols need to
heavily depend on timeout actions and randomization steps to perform
their functions.
The above characteristics of sensor protocols are far from common in
the literature of distributed systems. Thus, one is inclined to believe that the
“standard model” of distributed systems is not suitable for sensor protocols.
The search for a suitable model for sensor protocols is an obligatory first step
towards formal specification, verification, and design of these protocols.
There have been earlier efforts to model the software of sensor networks.
Examples of these efforts are [47], [3], [54], and [48]. We review these and other
efforts in the related work section of this chapter. Nevertheless, it is important
to state here that all these efforts are not directed towards modeling sensor
protocols; rather they are directed toward modeling sensor network applica-
tions. Clearly, sensor protocols are quite different from sensor applications in
terms of their functions and in terms of how they accomplish these functions.
For instance, sensor protocols need to deal with the intricate characteristics of
sensor networks, as they attempt to hide these characteristics from the sensor
applications. Thus, whereas a sensor protocol has to deal with unavoidable
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local broadcast, probabilistic message transmission, asymmetric communica-
tion, and message collision, a sensor application can view the sensor network
as a reliable medium for communicating sensing data. Also whereas a sensor
protocol depends heavily on timeout actions and randomization steps, a sensor
application rarely needs to resort to these devices.
2.1 Topology of Sensor Networks
The topology of a sensor network is a directed graph where each node
represents a distinct sensor in the network and where each directed edge is
labeled with some probability. A directed edge (u,v), from a sensor u to a
sensor v, that is labeled with probability p, where p > 0, indicates that if sensor
u sends a message, then this message arrives at sensor v with probability p
(provided that neither sensor v nor any “neighboring sensor” of v sends another
message at the same time).
There are two probabilities, α and β, where α > β, that label the edges
in the topology of a sensor network. An edge that is labeled with the large
probability α is called a strong edge, and an edge that is labeled with the small
probability β is called a weak edge. In this chapter, we assign α 0.95 and β
0.5. Below we discuss some experiments that we have carried out on sensors
and led us to this choice of probabilities in the topology of a sensor network
[18]. It is important to note that although the probability labels of α and β
are chosen to be 0.95 and 0.5 in this chapter, different values can be chosen









Figure 2.1: Topology of a sensor network
Let u and v be two distinct sensors in a network. Sensors u and v
are called strong neighbors iff there are two strong edges between them in the
network topology. The two sensors are called middle neighbors iff there are one
strong edge and one weak edge between them in the network topology. Sensors
u and v are called weak neighbors iff there is exactly one edge between them,
or there are two weak edges between them in the network topology. They
are called non-neighbors iff there are no edges between them in the network
topology. If there is an edge from u to v in the network topology, then u is
called an in-neighbor of v and v is called an out-neighbor of u.
As an example, Fig. 2.1 shows the topology of a sensor network that has
four sensors. In this network, sensors u and v are weak neighbors, sensors u
and v′ are strong neighbors, sensors u and v′′ are middle neighbors, and sensors
v and v′′ are non-neighbors. Sensor u has three out-neighbors, namely sensors
v, v′, and v′′. Thus, if sensor u sends a message, this message is received by
each of the two sensors v′ and v′′ with probability 0.95 and is received by sensor
v with probability 0.5. Also sensor u has two in-neighbors, namely sensors v′,
and v′′. Thus, if sensor v′ sends a message, then sensor u receives this message
with probability 0.95, and if sensor v′′ sends a message, then sensor u receives
12
this message with probability 0.5.
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distance between two sensors
Figure 2.3: Idealized percentage
of received messages
In [18], we describe some experiments that we have carried out using
Mica sensors [1]. In these experiments, a sensor u sends a sequence of messages
at the rate of one message per 5 seconds, and another sensor v attempts to
receive all the sent messages. The results of these experiments are summarized
in Fig. 2.2 where each point represents the result of one experiment. (Similar
results are also reported in [68] and [14].)
We observe that from Fig. 2.2 if the distance between two sensors u
and v is in the range 0 .. 38 inches, v receives between 90% and 100% of the







distance between two sensors
Figure 2.4: The probability label of an edge
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v is in the range 38 .. 67 inches, v receives anywhere between 0% and 100%
of the messages sent by u. Finally, the distance between sensors u and v is
longer than 67 inches, v receives 0% of the messages sent by u. From these
observations, the diagram in Fig. 2.2 can be “idealized” as shown in Fig. 2.3.
Let u and v be distinct sensors in the topology of a sensor network, and
assume there is a directed edge from u to v in the network topology. According
to the idealized diagram in Fig. 2.3, if the distance between u and v is in the
range 0 .. x, then v receives between 90% and 100% of the messages sent by
u. Thus, the directed edge from u to v can be labeled with a probability 0.95,
and the edge is strong. If the distance between u and v is in the range x .. y,
then v receives between 0% and 100% of the messages sent by u. Thus, the
directed edge from u to v can be labeled with a probability 0.5, and the edge
is weak. Fig. 2.4 shows how the probability label of an edge from one sensor
to another in the network topology is chosen based on the distance between
the two sensors.
2.2 Sensor Network Execution
A sensor is specified as a program that has global constants, local vari-
ables, and one or more actions. In general, a sensor is specified as follows:
14
sensor <sensor name>
const <const name> : <const type>, ... , <const name> : <const type>
var <var name> : <var type>, ... , <var name> : <var type>
begin
timeout-expires -> <action statements> // timeout action
[] rcv <msg.0> -> <action statements> // receiving action
... ...
[] rcv <msg.k-1> -> <action statements> // receiving action
end
Note that the actions of a sensor consist of exactly one timeout action
and zero or more receiving actions. Before we can discuss the execution of
sensor actions, we need to explain our model of real-time.
We assume that the real-time passes through discrete time instants:
instant 1, instant 2, instant 3, and so on. The time periods between consecutive
instants are equal. Executions of the different actions of a sensor occur only
at the time instants, and not during the time periods between instants. We
refer to the time period between two consecutive instants t and t + 1 as the
time unit (t, t + 1). (The value of a time unit is not critical to the current
presentation, but we estimate that the value of the time unit is around 100
milliseconds.)
At a time instant t, if the timeout of a sensor u expires, then u executes
its timeout action (at t). Executing the timeout action of sensor u at t causes
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u to update its local variables, and to send at most one message at t. It also
causes u to execute the statement “timeout-after <expression>” which causes
the timeout of u to expire (again) after k time units, where k is the value of
<expression> at the time unit (t, t + 1). The timeout action of sensor u is of
the following form:
timeout-expires -> <update local variables of u>;
<send at most one message>;
<execute timeout-after <expression>>
To keep track of its timeout, each sensor u has an implicit variable
named “timer.u”. In each time unit between two consecutive instants, timer.u
has a fixed positive integer value. The value of “timer.u” is determined by the
following two rules:
i. If the value of timer.u is k, where k > 1, in a time unit (t − 1, t), then
the value of timer.u is k − 1 in the time unit (t, t + 1).
ii. If the value of timer.u is 1 in a time unit (t−1, t), then sensor u executes
its timeout action at instant t. Moreover, since sensor u executes the
statement “timeout-after <expression>” as part of executing its timeout
action, the value of timer.u in the time unit (t, t + 1) is the value of
<expression> in the same time unit.
If a sensor u executes its timeout action and sends a message at an
instant t, then an out-neighbor v of u receives a copy of the message at t,







Figure 2.5: Topology of a sensor network
i. A random integer number is uniformly selected in the range 0 .. 99, and
this selected number is less than 100 ∗ p, where p is the probability label
of edge (u,v) in the network topology.
ii. Sensor v does not send any message at instant t.
iii. For each in-neighbor w of v, other than u, if w sends a message at t,
then a random integer number is uniformly selected in the range 0 .. 99,
and this selected number is at least 100 ∗ p′, where p′ is the probability
label of edge (w,v) in the network topology.
As an example, Fig. 2.5 shows the topology of a sensor network that
consists of three sensors, u, v, and w. Assume that sensor u sends a message
m at instant t. To determine whether message m will be received at sensor v
(at t), we need to consider three cases:
i. Sensor v sends a message m′ at t: In this case, v does not receive
message m.
ii. Neither sensor v nor sensor w sends any message at t: In this case, a
random number is uniformly selected in the range 0 .. 99. If this number
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is less than 95, then sensor v receives message m at t. If this number is
at least 95, then sensor v does not receive message m.
iii. Sensor v does not send any message, but sensor w sends a message m′
at t: In this case, two random numbers, n and n′, are uniformly selected
in the range 0 .. 99. There are four cases to consider.
(a) n < 95 and n′ < 50: m and m′ collide and v receives no message.
(b) n < 95 and n′ ≥ 50: v receives m (and m′ is lost).
(c) n ≥ 95 and n′ < 50: v receives m′ (and m is lost).
(d) n ≥ 95 and n′ ≥ 50: m and m′ are lost and v receives no message.
We conclude from the above example that a sensor can receive at most
one message at any instant. If two or more messages are sent at the same
instant by the neighboring sensors of a sensor u, then these messages collide
with one another and sensor u ends up receiving no message.
If a sensor u receives a message <msg.i> at an instant t, then u exe-
cutes the following receiving action at t.
rcv <msg.i> -> <update local variables of u>;
<may execute timeout-after <expression>>
Note that executing the receiving action of sensor u causes u to update its own
local variables. It may also cause u to execute the statement “timeout-after
<expression>” which causes the timeout of u to expire after k time units,
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where k is the value of <expression> in the time unit (t, t + 1). Note that
executing the receiving action of sensor u does not cause u to send any message.
Let us summarize how the execution of a sensor network proceeds dur-
ing one time instant t. First, the value of timer.u for every sensor u in the
network is decremented by one at t. Second, if the value of any timer.u be-
comes 0 at t, then sensor u executes its timeout action at t. Execution of the
timeout action of a sensor u at t assigns a new value to timer.u and may cause
u to send one message at t. Third, if a sensor u sends a message at t, then
any out-neighbor v of u may receive the message at t. Even if an out-neighbor
v of u has executed its timeout action but sent no message at t, v can still
receive u’s message at t. In other words, a sensor may execute its timeout
action followed by a receiving action at the same time instant provided that
the sensor does not send a message during its execution of the timeout action.
It follows from the above discussion that at a time instant, a sensor u executes
exactly one of the following:
i. u sends one message, but receives no message.
ii. u receives one message, but sends no message.
iii. u sends no message and receives no message.
A state of a protocol is defined by a value for each variable, including
the implicit variable timer.u, for each sensor u in the protocol. In every state
(whether legitimate or illegitimate), a value of each variable is selected from
the declared domain of the variable.
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2.3 Related Work
Several models for sensor applications have been proposed [3], [54], [47],
[48]. In general, the purpose of these models is to hide application program-
mers from low-level details such as routing, group management, resource man-
agement, etc. EnvioTrack [3] provides a high-level programming abstraction
for tracking applications in sensor networks. Newton and Welsh proposed a
functional language to specify the global behavior of a sensor application [54].
Liu et al. presented a state-centric programming model for sensor networks
[47]. Database approach was proposed in TAG [48]. Unlike these models,
our proposed model is to describe sensor protocols (that are responsible for
routing, group management, etc). Thus, our model deals with the intricate
characteristics of wireless sensor networks discussed at the beginning of this
chapter.
A high-level and abstract model of network protocols, called the Ab-
stract Protocol notation (AP), was proposed for traditional networks [29].
Later the Timed Abstract Protocol notation was developed, adding the ability
to express temporal behavior to AP [50]. Network protocols for traditional
networks (such as the Internet) can be specified and verified in these models.
Self-stabilization has been studied in the literature of distributed sys-
tems [5, 6, 21, 23, 58]. However, the models used in the literature, such as
shared memory models, do not accommodate the unique characteristics and
specific behaviors of sensor networks. In shared memory models, a sensor can
read some variables in its neighboring sensors and write its own variables, and
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so the details of message sending and receiving are hided.
Several self-stabilizing sensor protocols have been developed based on
abstract models. In [19], each sensor can communicate with its neighboring
sensors using shared variables. In [20], a sensor can communicate with any
other sensor in the network using an abstract channel. In [12], each sensor has
a FIFO message channel that can hold many messages sent by its neighbors.
We believe that these models are not suitable for designing and analyzing
sensor protocols. Also in [10], it is assumed that communications between
neighboring sensors are reliable. This assumption is not easy to achieve in
sensor networks.
There have been some efforts on transformations of self-stabilizing pro-
tocols from the models of distributed systems to a sensor network model,
where local broadcast and message collision are taken into account in shaping
the execution of sensor networks [34, 43]. The models are called a local broad-
cast model and write all with collision model. Also a similar model was used
to develop a self-stabilizing TDMA slot assignment algorithm in [35]. How-
ever, these models assume symmetric communications between sensors, and
do not consider probabilistic message transmission, and timeout actions and
randomization steps, which are very common in practical sensor networks.
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Chapter 3
Analysis Methods of Sensor Protocols
3.1 Analysis Methods
The model of sensor network protocols presented in the previous chap-
ter is rather detailed. Thus, we propose three analysis methods for analyzing
a sensor protocol specification based on this model. In the first analysis, the
correctness of the protocol specification is verified under two assumptions: ide-
alized message transmission and no message collision. In the second analysis,
the protocol specification is analyzed under the relaxation of the first assump-
tion. In the third analysis, the protocol specification is analyzed under the
relaxation of the first and second assumptions.
We refer to the first analysis as nondeterministic analysis, to the second
analysis as probabilistic analysis, and to the third analysis as collision analysis.
In the next two sections, we present an example of a sensor proto-
col specification, and then analyze this protocol specification using our three
analysis methods.
The two assumptions, of idealized message transmission and no message
collision, upon which our analysis methods are based are stated as follows.
i. Idealized message transmission: In the topology of a sensor network,
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the probability label of each strong edge is 1 (instead of 0.95), and the
probability label of each weak edge is 0 (instead of 0.5).
ii. No message collision: For every two distinct sensors u and v in a sensor
network, if u is a (in- or out-) neighbor of v, or if the network has a
third sensor w that is an out-neighbor for both u and v, then timer.u
and timer.v have distinct values at every instant during the execution of
the sensor network.
Some explanations concerning these two assumptions are in order. The
first assumption has the effect of removing all the weak edges from the topology
of a sensor network. It also has the effect of strengthening all the strong edges
in a network topology.
To explain the second assumption, recall that a sensor u can send a
message only during an execution of its timeout action, and that the timeout
action of sensor u can be executed at an instant t iff the value of timer.u is
1 in the time unit (t − 1, t). Thus, the assumption of no message collision
ensures that any two sensors, whose messages would collide if they were sent
at the same instant, are guaranteed never to send messages at the same instant
during any execution of the sensor network.
In order to make the second assumption, of no message collision, more
acceptable, it is recommended that each statement “timeout-after x” in a
sensor u be written as “timeout-after random(x, y)” where x > 0 and x ≤ y.
Thus, any new value assigned to timer.u is chosen uniformly from the range x
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.. y. Because the new values of the timer variables are chosen uniformly from
a reasonably large range, it is unlikely that any two timer variables will ever
have the same value.
Next, we describe in some detail the three analysis methods.
i. Nondeterministic analysis:
This analysis is used to verify that a protocol is guaranteed to reach, from
a given initial state, a desirable target state under the two assumptions
of idealized message transmission and no message collision. For this
analysis, we generate a state transition diagram of the protocol. In the
diagram, each protocol state has one or more outgoing edges, since the
protocol is specified using randomization steps of the form “timeout-
after random(x,y)”. From this diagram, we can verify that the protocol
nondeterministically satisfies the desired reachability property.
ii. Probabilistic analysis:
This analysis is used to verify that a protocol will reach, from a given
initial state, a desirable target state with a high probability, under the
assumption of no message collision. For this analysis, we generate a
probabilistic state transition diagram of the protocol, where each edge in
the diagram is labeled with a probability. Note that the probabilities that
label the edges in the probabilistic state transition diagram are computed
from the probability labels in the network topology of the protocol. From
this diagram, we can verify that the protocol probabilistically satisfies
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the desired reachability property.
iii. Collision analysis:
The nondeterministic and probabilistic analyses (in the first two anal-
yses) of a protocol can be carried out without specifying the values of
x and y in the randomization steps “timeout-after random(x,y)” in the
protocol specification. In choosing the values of x and y in these anal-
yses, one needs to observe two restrictions. First, the difference y − x
should be large enough to ensure that the probability of message colli-
sion is reasonably small (and so the nondeterministic and probabilistic
analyses of the protocol are reasonably accurate). Second, the difference
y − x should be small enough to ensure that the protocol reaches its
desirable target state in a reasonably short time. To determine the ap-
propriate values of x and y in the randomization steps, one can simulate
the protocol for many value combinations of x and y and select the most
appropriate values of x and y.
Note that each of the above three analyses is different from each other
on its objective, complexity, and/or result quality. Performing the nonde-
terministic analysis on a protocol is simpler and easier than performing the
probabilistic analysis on the protocol (since the nondeterministic analysis as-
sumes the idealized message transmission). However, the probabilistic analysis
yields a more realistic result than that of the nondeterministic analysis.
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3.2 A Protocol Specification Example
In this section, we use the model presented in Chapter 2 to specify
a sensor protocol that can be used by any sensor in order to identify the
strong neighbors of that sensor in its network. We refer to this protocol as
the neighbor computation protocol. (Recall that two sensors in a network are
strong neighbors iff there are two strong edges between them in the network
topology.)
To identify the strong neighbors of a sensor u, sensor u sends three
request messages. Whenever a sensor v receives a request message sent by
sensor u, sensor v sends a reply message. If sensor u receives two or more
reply messages sent by the same sensor v, then sensor u concludes that sensor
v is one of its strong neighbors.
Assume that the time period between two successive request messages
sent by the same sensor is fixed. Under this assumption, if two neighboring
sensors u and u′ start to send their request messages at the same time, then
the request messages sent by u will collide with the request messages sent
by u′ and both u and u′ may end up concluding wrongly that they have no
strong neighbors. Therefore, the time period between two successive request
messages should be uniformly selected from a “large enough” range 1 .. x. (In
the next section, we discuss how to choose a value for x.)
If every sensor v, that receives a request message from a sensor u, sends
a reply message immediately after it receives the request message, then all the
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reply messages will collide with one another and u may end up receiving no
reply messages. Thus, when a sensor v receives a request message from a sensor
u, v should wait a random period of time before it sends a reply message. The
length of this time period should be uniformly selected from the range 1 .. x.
Consider the scenario where a sensor v receives a request message from
a sensor u and decides to wait for some random period before it sends a reply
message to u. It is possible that before v sends its reply to u, v receives another
request message from another sensor u′. In this case, v should send one reply
message to both u and u′. This requires that sensor v maintains a reply set,
called rset, that contains the identifier of every sensor u from which v has
received a request message and to which v has not yet sent a corresponding
reply message. At the end of the above scenario, rset in sensor v has the value
{u, u′}.
Note that sensors u and u′ in the above scenario can be the same sensor
u. Thus, rset in each sensor is a multiset rather than a set. For example, at
the end of the above scenario, rset in sensor v has the value {u, u}.
Consider the scenario where a sensor u sends a request message and
decides to wait for a random period before it sends its second request mes-
sage. It is possible that before u sends its second request message, u receives
a request message from another sensor u′. In this case, u should send one
composite message that consists of the second request message and a reply
message to sensor u′. We refer to this composite message as a request-reply
message. In fact, every message in our protocol, whether a request message,
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a reply message, or a request-reply message, can be viewed as a request-reply
message.
Each message in the neighbor computation protocol has three fields:
(v,b,s)
The first field v is the identifier of sensor v that sent this message. The second
field b has two possible values: 0 and 1. If b = 0, then the message is a pure
reply message. If b = 1, then the message is either a request message or a
request-reply message. The third field s is the current value of rset in sensor
v. Note that if the message is a pure request message, then s = empty set.
Each sensor u has one constant x and eight variables as follows.
sensor u // sensor u where 0=< u < n
const x : integer
var nghs : set {u’ | 0<= u’ < n}, // strong ngh set
rcvd : array [0 .. n-1] of 0..3, // rcvd replies
rset : set {u’ | 0<= u’ < n}, // reply set
rm : 0..3, // remaining request msgs
done : boolean, // computation done or not
v : 0..n-1, // received sensor id
b : 0..1, // received request bit
s : set {u’ | 0<= u’ < n} // received reply set
Variable nghs is the set of strong neighbors that sensor u needs to
compute periodically. An element rcvd[v] in variable rcvd contains the number
of replies that sensor u has received from sensor v after u has sent its first
request message (in the current round of request messages). Variable rm
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stores the number of request messages that sensor u still needs to send (in
the current round of request messages). Variable rset is the multiset of all
the replies that sensor u needs to include in its next request-reply message.
Variable done is a boolean variable whose value is true when and only when
the current computation of the strong neighbors of sensor u is completed.
Initially, the value of nghs is the empty set, the value of every element
in variable rcvd is 0, the value of variable rm is 0, the value of variable rset
is the empty set, the value of variable done is true, and the value of implicit
variable timer.u is any value in the range 1 .. x.
Each sensor u has two actions that are specified in Fig 3.1.
Sensor u executes its first action when the value of its timer.u becomes
zero. The execution of this action starts by checking the value of rm. On one
hand, if the value of rm is 0, then u recognizes that it does not need to send
a request message, but it needs to send a reply message in case rset is non-
empty. Thus, the sent message is of the form (u,0,rset). Also if the value
of done is true, then sensor u chooses arbitrarily whether it starts to compute
its strong neighbors or not. If the value of done is false, sensor u invokes
a procedure named COMPNGH that computes the strong neighbors of sensor u
from array rcvd and adds them to the set nghs. (In COMPNGH, a sensor v is
computed to be a strong neighbor of u if rcvd[v] ≥ 2.) On the other hand,
if the value of rm is larger than 0, then u recognizes that it needs to send a
request-reply message of the form (u,1,rset).
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sensor u // sensor u where 0=< u < n
begin
timeout-expires ->
if rm=0 -> if rset != {} -> send (u,0,rset); rset := {}
[] rset = {} -> skip
fi;
if done -> skip // no new round








[] rm>0 -> send (u,1,rset); rset := {};
rm := rm-1;
if rm>0 -> timeout-after random(1,x)
[] rm=0 -> timeout-after random(x+1,x+1)
fi
fi
[] rcv (v,b,s) -> if !done -> rcvd[v] := rcvd[v] + NUM(u,s)
[] done -> skip
fi;
if b=1 -> rset := rset+{v}
[] b=0 -> skip
fi
end
Figure 3.1: Specification of sensor u in the neighbor computation protocol
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Sensor u executes the second action when u receives a (v,b,s) message
sent by a neighboring sensor v. The execution of this action starts by checking
the value of done. If the value of done is false, then the value of the element
rcvd[v] is incremented by NUM(u, s), the number of times u occurs in the
multiset s. Then sensor u checks the value of b in the received message. If the
value of b is 1, then v is added to the multiset rset.
3.3 A Protocol Analysis Example
In this section, we use the analysis methods outlined in Section 3.1
to verify the correctness of the neighbor computation protocol in Section 3.2.
Recall that there are three analysis methods: nondeterministic analysis, prob-
abilistic analysis, and collision analysis. We apply each of the three analyses
to the neighbor computation protocol in order.
3.3.1 Nondeterministic Analysis
Nondeterministic analysis is used to show that the neighbor computa-
tion protocol satisfies some desirable progress property under the two assump-
tions of idealized message transmission and no message collision. The analysis
is carried out from the point of view of a sensor u that needs to compute its
strong neighbors.
From the assumption of idealized message transmission, each non-neighbor,
weak neighbor or middle neighbor of u cannot receive any message sent by u,







































































Figure 3.3: Specifying the states in the state transition diagram in Fig. 3.2
neighbors and middle neighbors of u have no effect on the computation carried
out by u to identify its strong neighbors.
It remains to analyze the interaction between sensor u and each strong
neighbor v of u. Fig. 3.2 shows the state transition diagram that describes
the interaction between sensor u and its strong neighbor v. Each node in
this diagram represents a state of the two sensors u and v. Each dashed edge
represents the passing of real-time by one time unit. Each solid edge labeled u
represents the execution of the timeout action in sensor u and the execution of
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the corresponding receiving action, if any, in sensor v. Each solid edge labeled
v represents the execution of the timeout action in sensor v and the execution
of the corresponding receiving action, if any, in sensor u.
Each of the states S0 through S11 in the state transition diagram is
specified by a predicate in Fig. 3.3. Note that rcvd[v].u is the value of element
rvcd[v] in array rcvd in sensor u, rm.u is the value of variable rm in sensor u,
done.u is the value of variable done in sensor u, and NUM(u, rset.v) returns
the number of times u occurs in the multiset rset in sensor v.
From the state transition diagram, we conclude that the interaction
between sensors u and v satisfies the following progress property.
State S1 eventually leads to state S11.
Therefore, the protocol is correct under the two assumptions of idealized
message transmission and no message collision.
3.3.2 Probabilistic Analysis
Probabilistic analysis is used to show that the neighbor computing pro-
tocol satisfies some desirable progress property, with a high probability, under
the relaxation of the first assumption of idealized message transmission.
Under the assumption of idealized message transmission, the middle
neighbors and weak neighbors of a sensor u play no role in u’s computation of
its strong neighbors. When this assumption is relaxed, this is no longer true,


















































Figure 3.4: Probabilistic State Transition Diagram
Let u and v are distinct sensors in a network. If there are no edges or
if there is exactly one edge between u and v in the network topology, then v
has no effect on u’s computation of its strong neighbors. Otherwise, let there
be two edges between u and v in the network topology. Moreover, let p be
the probability label of edge (u,v) and q be the probability label of edge (v,u),
where p,q > 0. In this case, the probability that u identifies v as one of its
strong neighbors is the probability that u receives at least two reply messages
sent by v, which depends on the probability labels of edges (u,v) and (v,u), p
and q.
Fig. 3.4 shows a part of the probabilistic state transition diagram that
describes the interaction between sensor u and sensor v, where sensor u receives




























Figure 3.5: Specifying the states in the state transition diagram in Fig. 3.4
represents the execution of the timeout action in sensor u and the execution
of the corresponding receiving action, if any, in sensor v, and this transition
occurs with probability prob. Similarly each solid edge labeled v : prob repre-
sents the execution of the timeout action in sensor v and the execution of the
corresponding receiving action, if any, in sensor u, and this transition occurs
with probability prob. Each dotted edge represents a transition yielding to a
state, where sensor u receives less than two reply messages sent by sensor v.
Each of the state S12 through S17 in the probabilistic state transition
diagram is specified by a predicate in Fig. 3.5. The states of S0 through S11
are the same as in Fig. 3.3.
In the probabilistic state transition diagram, sensor u identifies v as
one of its strong neighbor if state S1 eventually leads to state S11. Thus, we
need to compute the probability that state S1 eventually leads to state S11
through all 18 different paths from S1 to S11.
The probability to reach S11 from S1 through a path (s1, . . . , si−1, si,
si+1, . . . , sk), where si is a state in the diagram, s1 = S1 and sk = S11, is
computed as
∏k−1
i=1 ei,i+1 where ei,i+1 is the probability to transit from si to
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si+1. For example, the probability to reach S11 from S1 through the path (S1,
S12, S13, S14, S15, S11) is (1 − p) ∗ p ∗ (0.5 ∗ p) ∗ q.
Recall that if v is a strong neighbor of u, then both p and q equal 0.95,
if v is a middle neighbor of u, then one of the two probabilities is 0.95 and
the other is 0.5, and if v is a weak neighbor of u, then both p and q equal 0.5.
Substituting these values of p and q in the diagram, we obtain the results in
Table 3.1. (Note that the result for a middle neighbor is the average of the
two cases of p, q = 0.95, 0.5 and p, q = 0.5, 0.95.)
Table 3.1: Probability that sensor u identifies sensor v as a strong neighbor in
probabilistic analysis
v Strong neighbor Middle neighbor Weak neighbor Non-neighbor
0.949 0.472 0.195 0
In the above diagram, some states such as S2, S3, S8, and S13 lead
to next states either by the execution of the timeout action in u or by the
execution of the timeout action in v. Note that the above analysis is based on
the assumption that in such states, the protocol transits to a next state by the
execution of the timeout action in u with probability 0.5 and by the execution
of the timeout action in v with probability 0.5. However, this assumption is not
accurate. The transitions to these states, S2, S3, S8, and S13, are caused by
the execution of the timeout action in u, and so the probability of transition
from each of these states to a next state by the execution of the timeout












Figure 3.6: The simulated network
u. Thus, in the above analysis, the probabilities to reach S11 through some
paths (for example, path (S1,S2,S5,S8,S6,S7,S10,S11)) are computed slightly
lower than those that can be obtained from observing an execution of the
protocol. However, the probabilities to reach S11 through other paths (for
example, path (S1,S2,S3,S4,S10,S11)) are computed slightly higher than those
that can be obtained from observing an execution of the protocol.
3.3.3 Collision Analysis
The above probabilistic analysis is based on the assumption of no mes-
sage collision. In order to take into account the effects of message collision on
the execution of a sensor network, one better simulates the network execution
and allows message collisions to occur in the simulation.
Consider the sensor network shown in Fig. 3.6. This network has nine
sensors: sensor 0 through sensor 8. We assume that only sensor 0 in this
network needs to periodically identify its strong neighbors. We also assume
that sensor 0 has four strong neighbors, namely sensors 1 through 4, two
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middle neighbors, namely sensors 5 and 6, and two weak neighbors, namely
sensors 7 and 8.
The “neighboring relation” over the sensors 1 through 8 is determined
by the following three rules.
i. If the distance between two sensors is at most 1, the edge is labeled with
probability 0.95 (i.e. a strong edge).
ii. If the distance between two sensors is larger than 1 and less than 2, the
edge is labeled with probability 0.5 (i.e. a weak edge).
iii. If the distance between two sensors is at least 2, there is no edge between
the two sensors.
In order to run the simulation of the neighbor computation protocol,
we need to choose the value x. There are two contradictory concerns that can
affect our choice of x. If x is large, say 1024, the probability of message collision
becomes small, and consequently the probability of correctly identifying a
strong neighbor, as measured from the simulation, becomes close to the same
probability, as estimated from the probabilistic analysis. On the other hand, if
x is large, the average execution time of the protocol, which is around 2∗x+1
time units, becomes large.
To choose an appropriate value for x, we ran the simulation three times
using different values of x: 64, 128, and 256. In each simulation run, we
measured the probability of correctly identifying a strong neighbor. Each of the
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simulation results is the average of 1000 runs. At the end, we chose the smallest
value of x whose simulation run yielded the probability of correctly identifying
a strong neighbor to become around 0.9. From Table 3.2, we conclude that
the value of x is 128.
Table 3.2: Probability that sensor 0 identifies sensor v as a strong neighbor in
collision analysis
v 1 2 3 4 Avg 5 6 Avg 7 8 Avg
x=64 0.81 0.835 0.851 0.826 0.831 0.413 0.376 0.395 0.132 0.153 0.143
x=128 0.888 0.877 0.897 0.898 0.89 0.435 0.404 0.42 0.157 0.157 0.157
x=256 0.918 0.94 0.935 0.94 0.933 0.468 0.454 0.461 0.169 0.19 0.18
From the simulation run where x = 128, we get the following results.
For a strong neighbor v, sensor 0 identifies v as a strong neighbor with proba-
bility 0.89. For a middle neighbor v, sensor 0 identifies v as a strong neighbor
with probability 0.42. For a weak neighbor v, sensor 0 identifies v as a strong
neighbor with probability 0.157. (Note that by choosing x = 128, the average
execution time of the protocol is around 26 seconds, under the assumption
that each time unit is 100 milliseconds.)
Table 3.3: Probability that sensor u identifies sensor v as a strong neighbor
Type Strong ngh Middle ngh Weak ngh Non-ngh
Nondeterministic analysis 1 0 0 0
Probabilistic analysis 0.949 0.472 0.195 0
Collision Analysis 0.89 0.42 0.157 0
As a summary, Table 3.3 shows the probability that a sensor u identifies
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another sensor v as a strong neighbor in each of the analysis methods. As we
relax the two assumptions of idealized message transmission and no message
collision one by one, the probability that u correctly identifies a strong neighbor
v is decreased. Moreover, middle neighbors and weak neighbors of u affect u’s
computation of its strong neighbors.
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Chapter 4
Sentries and Sleepers in Sensor Networks
One of the challenging problems in designing sensor networks is to
lengthen the lifetime of sensor batteries. One approach to solve this problem
is to exploit the idea that in some densely deployed networks, a fraction of
the sensors can go to sleep for predefined time periods, while the remaining
sensors stay awake and perform the assigned tasks in the network. The sleeping
sensors save their energy and lengthen the lifetime of their batteries, without
significantly degrading the performance of the applications running on the
sensor network. Examples of this approach can be found in [16], [15], [69],
[38], [70], [72], [59], [9].
We generalize this idea to be applicable to any, possibly sparsely pop-
ulated, sensor network: replace each sensor in the network by a group of n
sensors, for some n ≥ 2. The group of n sensors are deployed in a location
where a single sensor would have been deployed in the sparse network. This
group of n sensors act as one sensor as follows. For a time period, only one
sensor in the group, called sentry, stays awake and performs all the tasks as-
signed to the group, while the remaining sensors, called sleepers, go to sleep
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to save their batteries. At the beginning of the next time period, the sleepers
wake up, and all the sensors in the group elect a new sentry for the next time
period, and the cycle repeats.
Note that the sensors in a group are identical in every way so that each
of them can behave in exactly the same manner in performing the assigned
tasks, when this sensor is elected a sentry of the group. This implies that no
sensor has an identifier that distinguishes it from other sensors in its group.
Rather, every sensor in a group has the same group identifier.
The identifiers of two sensor groups in the same network, however,
are distinguishable so that when a sensor receives a message, the sensor can
determine whether this message was sent from a sensor in its own group or it
was sent from a sensor in a different nearby group. Note that a sensor in a
group needs to exchange messages with other sensors in its group in order to
elect a new sentry at the beginning of each time period. A sensor also needs
to exchange messages with sensors in adjacent groups in order to perform the
assigned tasks, when this sensor is elected a sentry of its group.
An alternative approach to lengthen the lifetime of sensor batteries in
a sparsely populated network is to provide each sensor with a large battery
whose lifetime is n times the lifetime of a regular battery. However, this
alternative approach is less reliable than our approach (where each sensor in
the sparsely populated network is replaced by a group of n sensors) as follows.
If a sensor fails in a network, then the network can compensate for the failed
sensor provided the network is designed using our approach rather than the
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alternative approach.
The protocol used by a group of n sensors to elect a new sentry at the
beginning of each time period is called a sentry-sleeper protocol. The goals of
a sentry-sleeper protocol are two-fold:
i. Ensure that at each instant not all the sensors in a sensor group are
sleeping. Thus, at each instant at least one sensor in the group is awake
and so can perform the tasks assigned to the group.
ii. Reduce the time periods where two or more sensors in a sensor group
are awake in order to reduce the wasteful use of sensor batteries. (Note
that if two or more sensors in a sensor group are awake during a time
period, then each of them performs the same tasks assigned to the group
during that period.)
When some fault occurs in a network, a sentry-sleeper protocol may
reach an illegitimate state that does not satisfy the above goals. Thus, even
starting from any illegitimate state, a sentry-sleeper protocol should be able to
converge to a legitimate state where at least one sensor in the group is awake,
and at most one sensor in the group is a sentry.
Other sentry-sleeper protocols are reported in [15], [9], [16], [70], [38].
The main assumption in these papers is that the sensors in a “sensor group”
have distinguishable identities; i.e. they have different physical locations, dif-
ferent connectivity, different message traffic, or different identifiers. Thus, the
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sensors in the network decide which one stays awake among their neighboring
sensors based on these different identities, so that they can not only save their
batteries but also provide some level of the performance of the applications
running on the network. Unlike these protocols, our protocol for electing a
sentry at the beginning of each time period is based on the assumption that
the sensors in a group are perfectly identical; i.e. they have identical locations,
connectivity, traffic, and identifiers. This feature makes our protocol scalable
and resilient against any attack by an adversary sensor in the group that may
lie about its own identity (i.e. lie about their locations, connectivity, ...) to
be elected a sentry over and over, and keep the legitimate sensors asleep for a
long time.
4.1 Sensor States and Transitions
Before we can explain the main features of our sentry-sleeper protocol,
we need to explain, in this section, the different states of a sensor and the
transitions between them.
Every sensor in a sensor group can be in any one of two states: an
idling state or a sleeping state. In the idling state, the sensor does nothing
but wait until either its timeout expires (in which case the sensor executes a
timeout action), or it receives a message (in which case the sensor executes a
receiving action). An action, whether a timeout action or a receiving action, of







Figure 4.1: Two states of a sensor
the sensor, send at most a message, or set the timeout of the sensor to expire
at a later time.
Also the sensor can execute the special statement “go-to-sleep” at the
end of an action. If a sensor executes this statement, the sensor changes its
state from idling to sleeping. In the sleeping state, the sensor does nothing but
wait until its timeout expires, then it executes a timeout action and changes
its state from sleeping to idling. Figure 4.1 shows the two states of a sensor
and the different transitions between them.
There are two main differences between the idling state and the sleeping
state of a sensor. First, in the idling state, the sensor can receive messages
that are sent by other sensors and execute corresponding receiving actions,
whereas in the sleeping state, the sensor cannot do so since it turns off its
radio as well as its processor and sensing devices to save energy during its
sleep. Second, the consumed energy when the sensor is in the idling state is
much larger than the consumed energy when the sensor is in the sleeping state
(as discussed in [51] and [71]). Therefore, for the sensor to save its energy as
much as possible, it should stay in its sleeping state as long as possible.
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4.2 The Sentry-Sleeper Protocol
The goal of our sentry-sleeper protocol is to make a group of n sensors
act as a single sensor whose lifetime is N ∗ F time units, where F is the
lifetime of a regular sensor, and 1 < N < n. The n sensors in the sensor group
constitute a sensor network whose topology is fully-connected, i.e. there are
two opposite-direction edges between every two nodes in the topology.
During a time period, called a turn, (n− 1) sensors of the sensor group
are in their sleeping states and the remaining sensor is in its idling state. In
a turn, each of the sleeping sensors is called a sleeper, and the awake sensor is
called a sentry. At the end of a turn, the sleepers wake up and all sensors in
the group elect a new sentry for the next turn. This cycle of a turn followed
by an election of a new sentry is repeated over and over until the batteries of
all sensors in the group are exhausted.
At the end of a turn, the sleepers wake up, and they along with the
sentry collaborate to elect a new sentry for the next turn as follows. Each
sensor in the group computes a random period, called a resolution period,
whose length is chosen uniformly from the range 1 .. 2*ravg−1, where ravg
is the average length (measured in time units) of the resolution period. Then,
each sensor sets its timeout to expire after its resolution period. The sensor
that chooses the smallest resolution period in the group times-out first, and
this sensor elects itself as the new sentry and starts the new turn by sending
a message of the form:
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sleep(gid, rt)
where gid is the identifier of the sensor group and rt is the remaining time in
the current turn. Initially, the remaining time in the current turn is assigned
the length of a turn, which is tl time units.
When a sensor u in the sensor group receives a sleep(gid, rt) message,
sensor u recognizes that a new sentry is elected for the current turn and decides
to sleep for rt time units. Thus, it sets its timeout to expire after rt time units,
then goes to sleep. The range of rt in the received sleep message is 1 .. tl.
Thus, the shortest sleeping period is 1 time unit, and the longest sleeping
period is tl time units.
After the elected sentry sends the first sleep(gid, rt) message, the sentry
computes a random period whose length rp is chosen uniformly from the range
1 .. 2*ravg−1, and sets its timeout to expire after rp time units. When the
sentry times-out, it sends the next sleep(gid, rt − rp) message. The sentry
keeps on sending sleep messages, until the remaining time in the current turn
becomes zero and all the sleepers wake up to elect a new sentry for the next
turn.
Notice that the sentry periodically sends a sleep message even when
all other sensors in the group are supposedly asleep and cannot receive any
messages. This feature is intended to handle the following case. Some sensors
in the group may not receive the first sleep(gid, rt) message sent by the sentry
at the beginning of a turn. These sensors can receive a later sleep(gid, rt′)
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message, where rt′ < rt and go to sleep for a period of rt′ time units in this
turn.
In this protocol, two (or more) sensors, say u and v, in the group can
select identical resolution periods and so they send their sleep messages at
the same time. The net effect is that none of the sensors in the group can
receive any sleep messages, since the two messages collide with one another.
Only sensors u and v consider themselves as sentries, and the other sensors in
the group do not recognize that a new sentry has been elected for the current
turn. However, our protocol ensures that one, only one, sensor in the group
eventually sends a sleep message at some instant t and makes all other sensors
go to sleep at t.
A formal specification for a sensor u in the group is given in Fig. 4.2.
It is important to note that in this protocol, the sensors in a group
compete to become a sentry purely based on randomization without resorting
to any difference in their identities that may give an advantage to some sensors
over others in the group. In a turn, each sensor in the group has the same
probability to become a sentry. Thus, each sensor can expect to become a
sentry once every n turns or so. A sensor u who fails to become a sentry for
a relatively long period, say for 3 ∗ n or 5 ∗ n turns, should suspect that some
sensors in the group are not following the protocol. In this case, sensor u may
decide to stay awake (and perform the assigned tasks to the group) and refuse
to go to sleep.
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sensor u
const gid : integer, {group id of sensor u}
tl : integer, {length of a turn}
ravg : integer {avg length of random period}
var sentry : boolean, {Is u sentry?}
awake : boolean, {Is u awake?}
rp : 1..2*ravg-1, {length of random period}
rt : 0..tl, {remaining time in current turn}
g : integer, {group id in received message}
t : 1..tl {remaining time in received message}
begin








rp := min(rp, rt);
rt := rt-rp;
timeout-after rp
[] awake and sentry ->
if rt>0 -> send sleep(gid, rt);
rp := random;
rp := min(rp, rt);
rt := rt-rp;
timeout-after rp









[] gid!=g -> skip
fi
end
Figure 4.2: Specification of sensor u in the sentry-sleeper protocol
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4.3 Stabilization of the Protocol
In this section, we sketch a proof that our sentry-sleeper protocol is
self-stabilizing. A state of this protocol is defined by a value for each variable
and each implicit variable timer.u for each sensor u in a group.
We assume that every state (whether legitimate or illegitimate) of the
protocol satisfies the following four conditions.
1. For every sensor u, the value of variable timer.u is at most tl time units.
(Note that this assumption is maintained by the execution of the proto-
col.)
2. For every sleeping sensor u, the value of its awake variable is false. (Note
that this assumption is maintained by the execution of the protocol.)
3. For every awake sensor u, the value of its timer.u is distinct from the
value of timer.v for any other awake sensor v. (Note that this assumption
is probabilistically maintained by choosing the value ravg to be large
relative to the number of sensors in the group.)
4. For every awake sensor u, if sensor u sends a message at instant t, then
an awake sensor v receives a copy of the message at t, provided that
sensor v does not send a message at t, and no other awake sensor except
u sends a message at t.
In our sentry-sleeper protocol, a legitimate state is defined as a state
that satisfies the following invariant :
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At least one sensor in the group is awake, and
at most one sensor in the group is a sentry.
Therefore, in a legitimate state, the number of sleepers is in the range 0 ..
n−1, and the number of sentries is in the range 0 .. 1.
The protocol is self-stabilizing iff it satisfies the following two conditions
[5].
i. Closure: Starting from any legitimate state, the execution of any action
in any sensor in the protocol yields a legitimate state.
ii. Convergence: Starting from any illegitimate state, the protocol is guar-
anteed to reach a legitimate state.
First, we show that starting from any legitimate state, the execution of
any action in any sensor in the protocol yields a legitimate state. The protocol
has two cases to consider. In the first case, the executed action is a timeout
action in a sensor u in the group. In this case, there are three possibilities to
consider when the timeout action is executed.
i. The value of awake in u is false: In this case, u concludes that u wakes
up from sleeping (by the assumption 2), and makes the value of awake
true. Thus, u becomes awake, and so the invariant holds.
ii. The value of awake in u is true and the value of sentry in u is false:
In this case, u elects itself as the new sentry and makes other sensors in
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the group sleep by sending a sleep message. Note that no other awake
sensor can execute this timeout action that causes the sensor to send a
sleep message at the same time (by the assumption 3). Thus, u is awake
and becomes the only sentry in the group, and so the invariant holds.
iii. The value of awake in u is true and the value of sentry in u is true: In
this case, there are two cases to consider depending on the remaining
time in the current turn. First, if the remaining time is bigger than zero,
u sends another sleep message. Thus, u is still awake and is still the only
sentry in the group. Second, if the remaining time is zero, u recognizes
that the current turn is finished, and withdraws from a sentry by making
its value of sentry false. Thus, u is still awake, but is not a sentry any
more. In both cases, the invariant holds.
In the second case, the executed action is a receiving action in a sensor
u in the group. In this case, there are two possibilities to consider when the
receiving action is executed.
i. When u receives a sleep message from another sensor v in the same
group: In this case, u recognizes that sensor v is elected a sentry for the
current turn, so u goes to sleep for the specified sleeping period in the
received message. Thus, sensor v is awake and is the only sentry in the
group, and so the invariant holds.
ii. When u receives a sleep message from a sensor in a different group: In
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this case, u ignores the message and does nothing. Thus, the invariant
holds.
Hence, starting from any legitimate state, the execution of a timeout action
or a receiving action in any sensor in the group yields to a legitimate state.
Next, we show that starting from any illegitimate state, our protocol
is guaranteed to reach a legitimate state within finite executions of actions in
the group. There are two states that violate the invariant as follows:
i. A state where all sensors in the group are sleeping: In this case, a sensor
u in the group is guaranteed to execute its timeout action within tl
time units (by the assumption 1). By executing the timeout action of
u, u becomes awake. Thus, at least one sensor in the group will wake
up within tl time units, and then only one of the awake sensors will
eventually become a sentry.
ii. A state where two or more sentries exist in the group: In this case, only
one sentry whose timer value is the smallest, say sensor u, times-out first
and then executes its timeout action to send a sleep message at some
instant t (by the assumption 3). The other sentries receive the sleep
message from u and go to sleep at t. Thus, all the sentries except u go
to sleep within finite executions of actions.
Therefore, starting from any illegitimate state, the execution of a timeout
action in some sensor makes the protocol reach a legitimate state within finite





















Figure 4.3: A time period during protocol execution
4.4 Protocol Analysis
Our protocol, as described in Section 4.2, makes a group of n sensors
act as one sensor whose lifetime is N ∗ F time units, where F is the lifetime
of a regular sensor and N is some quantity, called the effective number of the
sensors in the group. Clearly, we have 1 < N < n. In this section, we analyze
the protocol and estimate the value of N .
Figure 4.3 shows a time period T , consisting of a resolution period
followed by one turn of tl time units. Since the average length of a resolution
period is ravg time units, we have T = tl + ravg time units. During a turn,
a sentry sends a sleep message every random period rp whose average is ravg
time units. Therefore, the average number of sleep messages sent by a sentry
per turn is tl/ravg.
Let Eslp and Eidl be the amount of energy consumed by a sensor in the
sleeping state and in the idling state per time unit respectively, and Esnd and
Ercv be the amount of energy consumed by a sensor to send a message and
to receive a message respectively. There are two possible cases that can occur
during the time period T :
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i. Case 1 : The sensors in the group do not execute the protocol, and remain
in their idling states. The amount of energy consumed by n sensors in
this case, Enop is calculated as follows.
Enop = Eidl ∗ (tl + ravg) ∗ n
ii. Case 2 : The sensors in the group execute the protocol. The sentry stays
in the idling state and sends tl/ravg sleep messages for this time period.
Each of the (n − 1) sleepers stays in the idling state for a resolution
period, receives a sleep message, and sleeps for tl time units. Therefore,
the amount of energy consumed by n sensors in this case, Ep is calculated
as follows.
Ep = Eidl ∗ (tl + ravg) + Esnd ∗ (tl/ravg)
+(n − 1) ∗ (Eslp ∗ tl + Eidl ∗ ravg + Ercv)
From the above analysis, we can estimate the effective number of the




We present two figures, Figure 4.4 and 4.5, from the above formula for
the four cases tl = 30 ∗ ravg, 60 ∗ ravg, 90 ∗ ravg and 120 ∗ ravg in time units.
In both of the figures, we use the values in Table 4.1 for Eslp, Eidl, Esnd and
Ercv. These values are computed using the energy consumption model in [51],
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Table 4.1: Energy consumption of a sensor (in energy units)
Eslp 0.003 per time unit
Eidl 30 per time unit
Esnd 24.3 per message
Ercv 9 per message












Figure 4.4: N vs. ravg when n=4












Figure 4.5: N vs. n when
ravg=100
under the assumption that a time unit is 100 milliseconds, and a time period
taken for a sensor to send or receive a message is 30 milliseconds.
Figure 4.4 shows the relationship between the length of ravg and N
when n=4 and 5 ≤ ravg ≤ 1000 in time units. If ravg is 100 time units or
more, then the value of N no longer depends on ravg. Similarly, when n=2
and 9, if ravg is 100 time units or more, then the value of N no longer depends
on ravg.
Figure 4.5 shows the relationship between n and N when ravg = 100
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time units. From Figure 4.5, one can make two observations. First, tl does not
have a strong effect on the value of N , especially when n is small. Second, N
is closer to n when n is smaller. During a resolution period, all sensors in the
group need to stay awake, and so the total amount of energy consumed by the
sensors during this period is increased as n is increased. Thus, our protocol
becomes more efficient as n is smaller.
In the real execution of the protocol, the current sentry can run out of
the battery and die during its turn. Then there exists a time period where no
sensor in the group is awake to perform the tasks assigned to the group. We
call this time period a gap.
We can estimate the total length of gaps over the lifetime of a group
of n sensors from a simple formula. When the sentry dies during its turn,
the average time period that no sensor in the group is awake is tl/2 (because
the minimum time period is zero and the maximum time period is tl). Since
(n− 1) sensors can die during their sentry turns, the total length of gaps over
the lifetime is estimated as follows:
tl
2
∗ (n − 1)
The total length of gaps is relatively much smaller than the lifetime of the
group. Note that the total length of gaps is related to the number of sensors
in the group, not the lifetime of a regular sensor.
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4.5 Simulation Results
We have developed a simulator that can simulate the execution of our
sentry-sleeper protocol. This simulator simulates the behavior of a group of n
sensors whose topology is fully connected and also allows us to configure the
parameters of the protocol such as tl and ravg.
For the purpose of simulation, we have adopted the values in Table 4.1
as well as the following values:
• tl= 3000 time units
• ravg= 100 time units
• The amount of energy given to each sensor, at the beginning
of simulation, is enough to keep that sensor in its idling state
for 100000 time units.










Figure 4.6: The effective number
of the sensors









Figure 4.7: The total length of gaps
We ran simulations of this protocol for the three cases n = 2, 4 and 9,
and plotted the results in Figure 4.6 and 4.7. Figure 4.6 shows the effective
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number of the sensors N . Each circle mark represents the average effective
number of the sensors over 100 simulations and each X mark represents the
estimated effective number of the sensors. The effective number of the sensors
in simulation is larger than that in estimation, because in simulation, sensors
run out of their batteries and die over time and so the number of sensors in the
group decreases over time. As discussed in Section 4.4, the protocol becomes
more efficient as n is smaller.
Figure 4.7 shows the total length of gaps over the lifetime of a group
of n sensors. Each circle mark represents the average total length of gaps over
100 simulations and each X mark represents the estimated total length of gaps.
From the simulation results, we show that the effective number of the
sensors N is close to the number of sensors n in the group. That is, the group
of n sensors can lengthen its lifetime around n times the lifetime of a regular
sensor by adopting our protocol.
4.6 Related Work
It is suggested in SBPM[38] to divide the sensors in a network into two
sets, sentries and sleepers. Sentries stay awake, and provide basic communica-
tion services and coarse sensing services, while sleepers go to sleep to save their
energy. When the sentries detect events, they can wake up the sleepers for
more refined sensing. However, in SBPM, sentries are pre-selected and fixed.
Moreover, a central computer decides when sleepers go to sleep. In GAF[70],
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all sensors that are equivalent in routing are identified using geographical lo-
cation information. Then, only one sensor in a group of equivalent sensors
stays awake and participates in routing, while the other sensors turn off their
radios and go to sleep.
In Span[16] and TMPO[9], each sensor exchanges its neighbor informa-
tion to compute which sensor joins a connected backbone in a network. Only
sensors in the backbone participate in routing, while other sensors can go to
sleep to save energy. In ASCENT[15], a sensor in a network keeps track of
the number of its active neighbors and message loss rate, and joins a network
topology only if the sensor becomes helpful. However, once a sensor enters the
active state, it continues to be awake until it dies.
Other approaches to save energy in a sensor network have been pro-
posed in [32], [62], [71], [59], [69], [72]. In LEACH[32], to reduce communi-
cation cost, each cluster-head collects data messages from the sensors in the
cluster, and then compresses and forwards the messages to a base station. In
STEM[59], a sensor in a monitoring state turns off the radio. If the sensor
detects an event, it turns on the radio and wakes up other sensors if necessary.
Leader election protocols have been studied for single-hop single-channel
radio networks in [52], [40], [41] and [30]. However, in general, these protocols
assume that a station sending a message can simultaneously listen [52], [40],
[30]. These protocols may not be useful in a sensor network, since generally a
sensor cannot listen while the sensor is sending a message as in IEEE 802.11.
60
Chapter 5
Logical Grid Routing in Sensor Networks
A sensor network usually supports two communication patterns be-
tween the sensors in the network: unicast and broadcast. In the unicast pat-
tern, any sensor in the network can send a message whose ultimate destination
is the base station. This pattern is used, for example, when a sensor senses an
event and needs to report the event to the base station. In the broadcast pat-
tern, the base station can send a message whose ultimate destination is every
sensor in the network. This pattern is used, for example, to tune parameters
at the different sensors or reset the whole network. A routing tree whose root
is the base station can be used to provide both communication patterns.
It is difficult to design routing protocols for sensor networks. This is
because these routing protocols need to overcome the special challenges that
are posed by sensor networks. First, a sensor network has limited resources.
Examples of these resources are the memory available in each sensor, the en-
ergy remaining for each sensor, and the communication capacity of the sensor
network. Any routing protocol for sensor networks should not consume a large
fraction of the network resources. For example, sensors should not store a large
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routing table. Also, sensors should not send large routing messages frequently.
Second, sensors in a sensor network may start to execute the routing
protocol from an illegitimate state. Also the sensors can be unreliable. For
example, some sensors in the network may fail-stop when they run out of their
energy or when they are physically damaged. Any routing protocol for sensor
networks should be able to stabilize to a legitimate state, starting from any
state, and also should be able to recover from the situation where a sizable
fraction of the sensors fail-stop.
Third, several previous experimental studies showed the existence of
unreliable long links in sensor networks [14, 25, 60, 68, 76]. When sensors in a
sensor network build a routing tree, these unreliable links should be avoided,
since they result in poor message delivery. Not all long links are unreliable,
but sensors cannot easily identify which long links are reliable and which are
unreliable, especially when the traffic and the environment are changing dy-
namically. For this reason, distance vector routing protocols [22] may not
work well in sensor networks, since these protocols take advantage of all long
links but many of them are unreliable. One approach to avoid unreliable links
is to estimate link quality dynamically using beacons [60, 68]. Nevertheless,
link quality is highly affected by environment, traffic pattern, and interference
[68, 74, 76], and so it is hard to estimate link quality precisely, especially under
bursty traffic which is a common traffic pattern in sensor networks [74].
In this chapter, we present a routing protocol, called the logical grid
routing (LGR) protocol, that overcomes the challenges of sensor networks.
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First, the protocol is simple and so it consumes a small percentage of the
network resources. In particular, the protocol requires that every sensor in the
network sends only one routing message that consists of 2 – 4 bytes every 20
seconds (or less frequently), and stores no more than 10 – 15 bytes of routing
information. Second, the routing protocol is stabilizing such that starting
from any state, the protocol converges to a state where all the sensors and
only the sensors that can be connected to the routing tree are connected to
the tree. We show that the convergence time of the protocol is proportional
to the diameter of the sensor network. We also show that even if 50% of the
sensors in a network fail-stop, 84% of the remaining sensors in the network
can still route data messages. Third, we adopt a simple approach to avoid
unreliable long links in the routing tree. In this approach, we use off-line
experiments to estimate link quality, and use these results to identify reliable
links in the routing tree. The experiments in our testbed showed that this
simple approach works well in practice. Moreover, the LGR protocol has been
used to successfully support reliable delivery of bursty traffic in a large scale
sensor network [7].
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.1, we dis-
cuss a logical grid and potential parents of sensors in the logical grid. We
present the LGR protocol in Section 5.2 and prove that this protocol is sta-
bilizing in Section 5.3. We present the extended protocol with foster parents,
which allows a sensor to have a “foster parent” in the tree when all its potential
parents fail-stop in Section 5.4 and prove that this protocol is stabilizing in
63
Section 5.5. We show the simulation and experimental results of the LGR pro-
tocol in Section 5.6. In Section 5.7, we discuss the advantages and limitations
of the LGR protocol. We discuss related work in Section 5.8.
5.1 Logical Grid and Potential Parents
In this section, we first describe a logical grid and potential parents
of sensors in the logical grid, and present an algorithm to compute potential
parents for each sensor. We then discuss one of the methods to build a logical
grid.
We consider a sensor network where sensors are deployed at arbitrary
physical locations, but they are named as if they form an M ∗N logical grid. In
this network, each sensor is identified by a pair (i,j), called the sensor identifier
in the logical grid, where i= 0..M − 1 and j= 0..N − 1. The base station in
this network is sensor (0,0).
(To keep our presentation simple, we choose the base station to be the
grid point (0,0). In practice, it is advantageous to select the base station to be
the grid point (M/2, N/2) at the middle of the logical grid. In this case, the
maximum number of hops to be traveled by data messages from any sensor to
the base station is minimized. Moreover, the probability that the base station
can be separated from the rest of the network is also minimized.)
When a sensor (i,j) has a data item and wishes to send this data item
to its final destination, the base station (0,0), sensor (i,j) forwards the data
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item to a neighbor (i′,j′), where i ≥ i′ and j ≥ j′, that is closer towards (0,0)
than (i,j). The transmission of the data item from sensor (i,j) to sensor (i′,j′)
is called one hop. The “physical” distance between sensors (i,j) and (i′,j′)
should be small enough in order not to create a long link, but should be large
enough in order to reduce the number of hops until the data item reaches its
final destination.
Roughly, the requirement that sensor (i,j) forwards its data item to a
neighbor (i′,j′) can be stated as follows:
(i − i′) + (j − j′) = H
where H is a small positive integer, called the hop size. In this case, sensor
(i′,j′) is called a potential parent of sensor (i,j) in the routing tree whose root
is the base station (0,0). Thus, sensor (i,j) can have up to H + 1 potential
parents, sensors (i, j − H), (i − 1, j − H + 1) ... (i − H + 1, j − 1), and
(i−H , j). Note that the above characterization of potential parents may not
be valid for sensors on or near the boundary of the grid. We describe below
an algorithm to compute potential parents of each sensor including those on
or near the boundary of the grid.
It follows from the above discussion that if H is chosen to be two,
then each sensor (i,j) in the logical grid has up to three potential parents.
For example, referring to a logical grid in Fig. 5.1, the potential parents of
sensor (3,3) are sensors (1,3), (2,2), (3,1). However, not every sensor has










Figure 5.1: A 5*5 logical grid where the hop size is 2
no potential parent. Each of the two sensors (0,1) and (1,0) has only one
potential parent, namely the base station (0,0). Also, sensor (0,2) has two
potential parents (0,1), (0,0), and sensor (2,0) has two potential parents (0,0),
(1,0).
The algorithm in Fig. 5.2 can be used by any sensor (i,j) to compute
set P of its potential parents in an M ∗N logical grid where the hop size is H .
Next, we discuss one of the methods to build a logical grid and compute
the value of H . (Similar methods to build a logical grid for the case H = 1 can
be found in [24, 70].) We divide a network area into grid squares where each
size is d∗d. In this network, a sensor is assigned a logical identifier (i,j), if the
sensor is deployed at the grid square (i,j). The sensor acts as if it is deployed
at the grid point (i,j), that is the central point of the grid square, of the logical
grid. For example, Fig. 5.3 shows a network area that consists of three grid
squares. In Fig. 5.3, a dashed square represents each grid square, and solid
lines represent the imposed logical grid for the network area. Note that the
value of d needs to be selected such that at least one sensor is deployed at each
grid square with a high probability.
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Algorithm
inputs M,N : integer, // M*N grid
H : integer, // hop size
i : 0..M-1,
j : 0..N-1
outputs set P of potential parents of sensor (i,j)
in an (M*N) grid whose hop size is H
variables u,v : 0..H
begin
u := 0;
do u <= H -> v := H-u;
if i-u>=0 and j-v>=0 -> add sensor (i-u, j-v) to set P
[] i-u<0 and j-v>=0 -> add sensor (0, j-v) to set P
[] i-u>=0 and j-v<0 -> add sensor (i-u, 0) to set P




remove sensor (i,j) from set P
end





Figure 5.3: Network area
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We assume that each sensor knows its physical location (x,y) using
GPS or localization services in [36, 61] and the side length of a grid square d.
We also assume that the reliable transmission range of sensors is R. Using its
physical location and d, each sensor decides its logical identifier (i,j). (In this
work, we assume that only one sensor is deployed at each grid square. If two
or more sensors are deployed at the same grid square, only one sensor among
them can be selected and stay awake to save energy by using an energy saving
protocol such as [28, 70].)
In order to establish that the imposed logical grid and the selected H
are valid, each sensor should be able to “reliably” exchange messages with each
of its potential parents. In other words, R should be larger than the maximum
distance between a sensor and its potential parents. Therefore, we need the
following condition.
R ≥ √d2 + ((H + 1) ∗ d)2 i.e. R ≥ d ∗ √H2 + 2H + 2
For example, consider the case H = 2. In this case, a sensor (i,j) has the
maximum distance with its potential parent (i-2, j) (or (i,j-2)). The maxi-
mum distance between two sensors deployed at grid squares (i,j) and (i-2,j) is
computed as d∗√10, as shown in Fig. 5.3. Thus, R should be at least d∗√10.
We perform off-line experiments to find the reliable transmission range
R of sensors, and then we select the largest integer H that satisfies the above
condition. Note that we need to conservatively measure R so that a sensor
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can communicate with each of its potential parents reliably, even under heavy
interfering traffic.
From now on, we assume that the imposed logical grid on the sensor
network and the selected hop size are valid. We also assume that neighbor
relation is symmetric. Therefore, if a sensor u can receive a message sent by
another sensor v, sensor v can receive a message sent by sensor u.
5.2 The Logical Grid Routing Protocol
The purpose of the LGR protocol is to build and maintain a routing
tree whose root is the base station (0,0). Each sensor (i,j) chooses one of its
potential parents to be its parent in this tree.
Initially, only the base station (0,0) is in the routing tree. The base
station periodically sends a message of the form, connected(0,0), every random
period whose length is chosen uniformly from the range rmin .. rmax, where
the average length of the range rmin .. rmax is T time units. (This random
period is to reduce the probability of connected message collision.)
When a sensor (i,j), that is currently not connected to the tree, receives
a connected(i′,j′) message and checks that sensor (i′,j′) is one of its potential
parents, sensor (i,j) becomes connected to the tree and makes sensor (i′,j′)
its parent. From this point on, sensor (i,j) sends a connected(i,j) message
periodically every random period whose length is chosen uniformly from the
range rmin .. rmax.
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When a sensor (i,j), that is currently connected to the tree and whose
parent is sensor (i′,j′), receives a connected(i′′,j′′) message and checks that
sensor (i′′,j′′) is one of its potential parents, sensor (i,j) remains connected
to the tree, but changes its parent in the tree from sensor (i′,j′) to sensor
(i′′,j′′). In this case, sensor (i,j) continues to send a connected(i,j) message
periodically every random period whose length is chosen uniformly from the
range rmin .. rmax.
When a sensor (i,j), that is currently connected to the tree and whose
parent is sensor (i′,j′), does not receive any connected(i′′,j′′) message from
any of its potential parents for a time period of tmax ∗ T time units, sensor
(i,j) concludes that it is no longer connected to the tree and stops sending
connected(i,j) messages. (We discuss how to choose a value of tmax below.)
Later when sensor (i,j) receives a connected(i′′,j′′) message and checks that
sensor (i′′,j′′) is one of its potential parents, sensor (i,j) becomes connected
again to the tree and makes sensor (i′′,j′′) its parent in the tree.
A specification for the base station is given in Fig. 5.4.
We mentioned earlier that when a sensor does not receive a connected
message from any of its potential parents for the time period of tmax ∗ T
time units, the sensor recognizes that it is no longer connected to the routing
tree. This feature is implemented by providing each sensor (i,j), where i = 0
or j = 0, with a variable trc whose value is in the range 0 .. tmax. When
sensor (i,j) receives a connected message from any of its potential parents,
trc is assigned the value tmax. Every time sensor (i,j) times-out to send a
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sensor (0,0) // base station
const rmin,rmax : integer // min and max interval whose avg is T
var r : rmin..rmax // random interval to send next connected msg
begin
time-out expires -> send connected(0,0);
r := rand; time-out after r
end
Figure 5.4: Specification of sensor (0,0) in the LGR protocol
connected message, the value of variable trc is decremented by one. When the
value of variable trc becomes zero, sensor (i,j) recognizes that it is no longer
connected to the routing tree.
During the execution of the protocol, a sensor u may consecutively
choose small random periods for some number of times, and some of connected
messages sent by the potential parents of sensor u may be lost. Nonetheless,
we assume that sensor u is truly disconnected from the routing tree if the
value of trc in u becomes zero. In order to establish that our assumption
is valid, we need to assign tmax a reasonably large value that ensures the
following with a high probability: if any potential parent v of a sensor u sends
a connected message periodically, then sensor u is guaranteed to receive a
connected message sent by v before the value of trc in u becomes zero. (Note
that this value of tmax can be estimated based on the values of rmin and
rmax, and the probability of message loss in the network.) From now on, we
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assume that a reasonable value that makes our assumption valid is assigned
to tmax.
A specification for sensor (i,j), where i = 0 or j = 0, is given in Fig. 5.5.
sensor (i,j) // a sensor (i,j) in an M*N grid where i=!0 or j!=0
const P : set of potential parents of sensor (i,j),
rmin,rmax : integer, // min and max interval whose avg is T
tmax : integer // max time to be connected
var pid : an element from P, // parent identifier
trc : 0..tmax, // time to remain connected




rcv connected(x,y) -> if (x,y) in P -> pid := (x,y); // choose parent
trc := tmax
[] !((x,y) in P) -> skip
fi
[] time-out expires -> trc := max(trc-1,0);
if trc>0 -> send connected(i,j)
[] trc=0 -> skip // lose parent
fi; r := rand; time-out after r
end
Figure 5.5: Specification of sensor (i,j) in the LGR protocol
Notice that in every state of the protocol, the value of timer.u for every
sensor u in the network is at most rmax. (This is maintained by the execution
of the protocol.)
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In the LGR protocol, the parent of a sensor at any time is the last po-
tential parent from which this sensor received a connected message. In other
words, a sensor keeps changing its parent whenever it receives a connected mes-
sage from another potential parent. This feature provides two nice properties:
load balancing and fast fault recovery. First, load balancing is achieved, since
the data messages, that are generated at the same sensor, are likely to follow
different routes to the base station. Second, fast fault recovery is achieved
when the current parent of a sensor fail-stops. In this case, the sensor replaces
this parent as soon as it receives a connected message from another potential
parent. (Note that this feature may cause the arrival of data messages at the
base station out of order. However, this is not a problem in sensor networks
since most data messages are tagged with the real-time of when they were
generated.)
Next, we specify how this protocol is used to route data messages to
the base station (0,0). When a sensor (i,j), other than the base station, has
a data message to route to the base station, sensor (i,j) first checks whether
or not it is connected to the routing tree. If the value of variable trc in sensor
(i,j) is more than zero, sensor (i,j) concludes that it is connected to the tree.
In this case, sensor (i,j) sends the message after attaching its parent identifier
pid to the message. Otherwise, sensor (i,j) recognizes that it is not connected
to the tree and drops the message.
When the base station (0,0) receives any data(i,j) message, the base
station accepts the data message even if (i,j) is not (0,0). This is because the
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ultimate destination of all data messages is the base station. Note that the
same data message may be received by the base station more than once, since
the data message is still forwarded along the routing tree until it reaches the
base station. Thus, the snooping feature of the base station can only increase
the probability that every data message is received (at least once) by the base
station.
5.3 Stabilization of the Protocol
In this section, we sketch a proof that the protocol in Section 5.2 is
self-stabilizing. This proof is based on the following four assumptions.
A1) Each sensor in the protocol is either up or down. Up sensors execute
the protocol as desired, while down sensors just fail-stop. Moreover,
whether a sensor is up or down does not change along any execution of
the protocol.
A2) For every two distinct up sensors u and v, if u is a neighbor of v, or if
there exists a third sensor w that is a neighbor for both u and v, then
timer.u and timer.v have distinct values. (Note that this assumption is
probabilistically maintained by choosing the difference rmax − rmin to
be large relative to the number of neighbors of a sensor.)
A3) For every up sensor u, if the value of trc in sensor u is 1, then sensor u
chooses a value for timer.u such that the value of timer.u is larger than
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the value of timer.v for any up potential parent v of sensor u.
A4) For every up sensor u, if the value of trc in sensor u is 0 or 1, and any
potential parent of sensor u sends a connected message, then sensor u
receives the connected message.
(Note that assumptions A3 and A4 ensure that if any potential parent
v of a sensor u sends a connected message periodically, then sensor u is guar-
anteed to receive a connected message sent by v before the value of trc in u
becomes 0.)
In the protocol, a state of a sensor u is defined by the value of variable
trc and the value of variable timer.u in sensor u, and the state of each up
potential parent v of sensor u. Sensor u is in one of the following two states:
(We use the notation <var> .u to denote the value of variable <var> in sensor
u.)
i. Sensor u is in a c-state iff u is the base station, or at this state
(trc.u > 1 and there exists an up potential parent v of u where v is in a
c-state) or
(trc.u = 1 and there exists an up potential parent v of u where v is in a
c-state and timer.u > timer.v)
ii. If sensor u is not in a c-state, then sensor u is in a d-state.
(During the execution of the protocol, the value of timer.u, as well as other
variables, in sensor u can be corrupted, but we assume that the protocol is
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implemented such that in every state, the value of timer.u is at most rmax.)
A configuration of the protocol is defined by the state for each up sensor
in the protocol.
Regardless of the initial configuration of the protocol, from the grid
size M ∗ N , the hop size H , and the set of up sensors in the grid, we can
compute the status (whether reachable or unreachable) of each up sensor in
the protocol. The status of an up sensor u is reachable iff sensor u is the base
station (0,0), or the protocol has an up sensor v such that v is an element
of P.u and the status of v is reachable. Otherwise, the status of sensor u is
unreachable. Note that a down sensor has no status, and if the base station is
up, then its status is always reachable.
A configuration of the protocol is legitimate iff the following two con-
ditions hold for every up sensor u in the protocol.
• If sensor u is reachable, sensor u is in a c-state in the configuration.
• If sensor u is unreachable, sensor u is in a d-state and trc.u = 0 in the
configuration.
Lemma 5.1: Starting from any legitimate configuration, for every reachable
sensor u, the execution of any action in sensor u yields a legitimate configu-
ration.
Proof. The protocol has two cases to consider. In the first case, the executed
action is the receiving action in sensor u. In this case, if sensor u receives a
76
connected message from one of its potential parents, trc.u is set to tmax. Oth-
erwise, sensor u drops the message and does nothing. Therefore, the receiving
action in u yields a legitimate configuration. In the second case, the executed
action is the timeout action in sensor u. In this case, sensor u first decreases
trc.u by one. However, since u is reachable, there exists at least one up sensor
v such that v is an element of P.u and the status of v is reachable. Thus, u
will receive a connected message from a sensor that is an element of P.u before
trc.u becomes 0, and so trc.u remains to be bigger than 0 (by assumptions A3
and A4). Second, u sends a connected message (since trc.u > 0). If there is a
sensor v where u ∈ P.v and trc.v = 1, then v receives the connected message
sent by u and sets trc.v to tmax (by assumption A4). Third, u chooses a ran-
dom value for timer.u. If trc.u = 1, u chooses a value for timer.u according to
assumption A3, and so u remains in a c-state. Therefore, the timeout action
in u yields a legitimate configuration.
Lemma 5.2: Starting from any legitimate configuration, for every unreach-
able sensor u, the execution of any action in sensor u yields a legitimate con-
figuration.
Proof. The protocol has two cases to consider. In the first case, the executed
action is the receiving action in sensor u. In this case, since sensor u is unreach-
able, the protocol has no up sensor v such that v is an element of P.u and the
status of v is reachable. Thus, sensor u always drops the received message, and
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does nothing. Therefore, the receiving action in u yields a legitimate configu-
ration. In the second case, the executed action is the timeout action in sensor
u. In this case, trc.u remains 0 by executing the statement “max(trc-1,0)”.
Therefore, the receiving action in u yields a legitimate configuration.
Theorem 5.1: (Closure) Starting from any legitimate configuration, the
protocol is guaranteed to maintain a legitimate configuration.
Proof. The proof follows from the proofs of Lemmas 5.1, and 5.2.
The following definitions are useful to prove the convergence of the
protocol. We define the connection graph C of the protocol as a directed
graph that satisfies the following two conditions. First, each node in graph
C represents a distinct sensor in the set of reachable sensors in the protocol.
Second, each directed edge (u, v) from a node u to a node v in graph C
indicates that sensor v is a potential parent of sensor u. We define the height
of a connection graph C as the maximum number of edges in any path from
any node to the base station in graph C. Let the height of graph C be K.
We define the disconnection graph D of the protocol as a directed graph
that satisfies the following two conditions. First, each node in graph D repre-
sents a distinct sensor in the set of unreachable sensors in the protocol. Second,
each directed edge (u, v) from a node u to a node v in graph D indicates that
sensor v is a potential parent of sensor u. We define the height of a disconnec-
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tion graph D as the maximum number of nodes in any path from any node to
another node in graph D. Let the height of graph D be L.
Next, we show that starting from any illegitimate configuration, our
protocol is guaranteed to reach a legitimate configuration within a finite time
period.
Lemma 5.3: Starting from any illegitimate configuration, every reachable
sensor u is guaranteed to be in a c-state within K ∗ tmax ∗ rmax time units.
Proof. Let the base station be node u0 in the connection graph C of the
protocol. If u0 is up, u0 sends a connected message periodically. (Note that
if u0 is down, the connection graph of the protocol does not exist.) Thus, for
every node u1 where there exists edge (u1,u0) in graph C, u1 is guaranteed to
receive at least one connected message from u0, and reach a c-state by setting
trc.u to tmax within tmax ∗ rmax time units (by assumptions A3 and A4).
Moreover, u1 is guaranteed to start sending a connected message periodically
within tmax ∗ rmax time units. Assume that for every node uK−1 where
there exist edges (ui,ui−1), 1 ≤ i ≤ K − 1, in graph C, uK−1 is guaranteed
to reach a c-state and start sending a connected message periodically within
(K − 1) ∗ tmax ∗ rmax time units. For every node uK where there exist edges
(ui,ui−1), 1 ≤ i ≤ K, in graph C, uK is guaranteed to receive at least one
connected message from any uK−1, and reach a c-state within K ∗tmax∗rmax
time units (by assumptions A3 and A4). Therefore, every node in graph C
reaches a c-state within K ∗ tmax ∗ rmax time units, if the height of graph C
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is K.
Lemma 5.4: Starting from any illegitimate configuration, for every unreach-
able sensor u, it is guaranteed that sensor u is in a d-state and trc.u = 0 within
L ∗ tmax ∗ rmax time units.
Proof. Every unreachable sensor u is always in a d-state. Therefore, we only
need to show that trc.u becomes 0 within a finite time period. In graph D,
there exists at least one node that has no outgoing edge, since all nodes in
graph D are unreachable. For every node u0 where there exists no outgoing
edge from u0 in graph D, u0 will not receive any connected message from a
node v where there exists edge (u0, v) in graph D. Thus, it is guaranteed
that trc.u0 becomes 0 within tmax ∗ rmax time units. Assume that for every
node uL−2 where there exist edges (ui,ui−1), 1 ≤ i ≤ L − 2, in graph D, it
is guaranteed that trc.uL−2 becomes 0 within (L − 1) ∗ tmax ∗ rmax time
units. Since uL−2 does not send a connected message, for every node uL−1
where there exist edges (ui,ui−1), 1 ≤ i ≤ L − 1, in graph D, uL−1 will not
receive any connected message from any uL−2. Thus, it is guaranteed that
trc.uL−1 becomes 0 within L ∗ tmax ∗ rmax time units. Therefore, for every
node u in graph D, it is guaranteed that u is in a d-state and trc.u = 0 within
L ∗ tmax ∗ rmax time units, if the height of graph D is L.
Theorem 5.2: (Convergence) Starting from any illegitimate configuration,
the protocol is guaranteed to reach a legitimate configuration within max(K ∗
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tmax ∗ rmax, L ∗ tmax ∗ rmax) time units.
Proof. The proof follows from the proofs of Lemmas 5.3, and 5.4.
5.4 The Routing Protocol with Foster Parents
According to the LGR protocol in Section 5.2, a sensor has a parent in
the routing tree as long as this sensor keeps on receiving connected messages
from one or more of its potential parents. Thus, if at least one of the potential
parents of a sensor is up and connected to the routing tree, the sensor remains
connected to the tree. Unfortunately, it is possible that all the potential par-
ents of a sensor fail-stop. When this happens, the sensor no longer receives
any connected messages from any of its potential parents, and so it becomes
disconnected from the routing tree.
To solve this problem, we extend the LGR protocol such that a sensor
remains connected to the routing tree even if all its potential parents have
fail-stopped as follows. When a sensor (i,j) has no parent and receives a
connected message from some sensor (i′,j′), which is not a potential parent
of sensor (i,j), sensor (i,j) makes sensor (i′,j′) its foster parent in the routing
tree. In this case, sensor (i,j) becomes connected to the tree and it can route
the data messages to the base station, but it does not send any connected(i,j)
messages. (The reason for this last restriction is to prevent any subset of
sensors from forming a directed cycle of foster parent relationships.)
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When a sensor (i,j) is connected to the routing tree via a foster parent
(i′,j′), and receives a connected(i′′,j′′) message from a sensor (i′′,j′′), then
sensor (i,j) makes sensor (i′′,j′′) its parent or its foster parent (depending on
whether (i′′,j′′) is a potential parent of (i,j)) in the routing tree.
When a sensor (i,j) is connected to the routing tree via a foster parent,
but does not receive any connected message for a time period of tmax ∗ T
time units, it becomes disconnected from the tree and no longer forwards data
messages to the base station.
A specification for sensor (i,j), where i = 0 or j = 0, is given in
Fig. 5.6. (Note that a specification for the base station is identical to the one
in Section 5.2.)
5.5 Stabilization of the Protocol with Foster Parents
In this section, we sketch a proof that the protocol in Section 5.4 is
self-stabilizing. This proof is based on assumptions A1 and A2 discussed in
Section 5.3, and the following two assumptions.
B3) For every up sensor u, if the value of trc in sensor u is 1, then sensor u
chooses a value for timer.u such that the value of timer.u is larger than
the value of timer.v for any up neighbor v of sensor u.
B4) For every up sensor u, if the value of trc in sensor u is 0 or 1, and any
neighbor of sensor u sends a connected message, then sensor u receives
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sensor (i,j) // a sensor (i,j) in an M*N grid where i=!0 or j!=0
const P : set of potential parents of sensor (i,j),
rmin,rmax : integer, // min and max interval whose avg is T
tmax : integer
var pid : a sensor (i’,j’) where i!=i’ or j!=j’, // parent identifier
trc : 0..tmax, // time to remain connected





if ((x,y) in P) or (trc=0) or (trc>0 and !(pid in P)) ->
pid := (x,y); // choose new parent
trc := tmax
[] !((x,y) in P) and (trc>0) and (pid in P) -> skip
fi
[] time-out expires -> trc := max(trc-1,0);
if trc>0 and (pid in P) -> send connected(i,j);
[] trc=0 or !(pid in P) -> skip
fi; r := rand; time-out after r
end
Figure 5.6: Specification of sensor (i,j) in the LGR protocol with foster parents
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the connected message.
Note that the proof in this section is similar to that in Section 5.3. However,
the proof in this section needs to consider the cases where some sensors in the
protocol have foster parents.
In the protocol, a state of a sensor u is defined by the value of variable
pid, the value of variable trc, and the value of variable timer.u in sensor u, and
the state of each up neighbor v of sensor u. Sensor u is in one of the following
three states:
i. Sensor u is in a c-state iff u is the base station, or at this state
pid.u ∈ P.u and ((trc.u > 1 and there exists an up potential parent v of
u where v is in a c-state) or
(trc.u = 1 and there exists an up potential parent v of u where v is in a
c-state and timer.u > timer.v))
ii. Sensor u is in a j-state iff at this state
pid.u ∈ P.u and ((trc.u > 1 and there exists an up neighbor v of u where
v is in a c-state) or
(trc.u = 1 and there exists an up neighbor v of u where v is in a c-state
and timer.u > timer.v))
iii. If sensor u is neither in a c-state nor in a j-state, then sensor u is in a
d-state.
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Regardless of the initial configuration of the protocol, from the grid
size M ∗ N , the hop size H , and the set of up sensors in the grid, we can
compute the status (whether reachable, weakly reachable, or unreachable) of
each up sensor in the protocol. The status of an up sensor u is reachable iff
sensor u is the base station (0,0), or the protocol has an up sensor v such that
v is an element of P.u and the status of v is reachable. The status of sensor
u is weakly reachable iff sensor u is not reachable, and the protocol has an up
sensor v such that v is an element of Ngh.u and the status of v is reachable,
where Ngh.u is the set of up sensors that are neighbors of sensor u and are
not elements of P.u. Otherwise, the status of sensor u is unreachable.
A configuration of the protocol is legitimate iff the following three con-
ditions hold for every up sensor u in the protocol.
• If sensor u is reachable, sensor u is in a c-state in the configuration.
• If sensor u is weakly reachable, sensor u is in a j-state in the configuration.
• If sensor u is unreachable, sensor u is in a d-state and trc.u = 0 in the
configuration.
Lemma 5.5 : Starting from any legitimate configuration, for every reachable
sensor u, the execution of any action in sensor u yields a legitimate configu-
ration.
Lemma 5.6 : Starting from any legitimate configuration, for every weakly
reachable sensor u, the execution of any action in sensor u yields a legitimate
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configuration.
Lemma 5.7 : Starting from any legitimate configuration, for every un-
reachable sensor u, the execution of any action in sensor u yields a legitimate
configuration.
The proofs of Lemmas 5.5, 5.6, and 5.7 are similar to those of Lemmas
5.1 and 5.2.
Theorem 5.3: (Closure) Starting from any legitimate configuration, the
protocol is guaranteed to maintain a legitimate configuration.
Proof. The proof follows from the proofs of Lemmas 5.5, 5.6, and 5.7.
We define the connection graph C of the protocol and the height of
the connection graph, K, as they are defined in Section 5.3. We also define
the disconnection graph D of the protocol and the height of the disconnection
graph, L, as they are defined in Section 5.3. Next, we show that starting from
any illegitimate configuration, our protocol is guaranteed to reach a legitimate
configuration within a finite time period.
Lemma 5.8 : Starting from any illegitimate configuration, every reachable
sensor u is guaranteed to be in a c-state within K ∗ tmax ∗ rmax time units.
Proof. This proof is similar to that of Lemma 5.3.
Lemma 5.9 : Starting from any illegitimate configuration, every weakly
reachable sensor u is guaranteed to be in a j-state within (K +1)∗tmax∗rmax
86
time units.
Proof. By Lemma 5.8, every reachable sensor is guaranteed to reach a c-state,
and start sending a connected message periodically within K ∗ tmax ∗ rmax
time units. Since sensor u is weakly reachable, there exists at least one up
sensor v such that v is an element of Ngh.u, and the status of v is reachable.
Thus, every sensor u is guaranteed to receive at least one connected message
from a sensor that is an element of Ngh.u, and reach a j-state within (K +
1) ∗ tmax ∗ rmax time units (by assumptions B3 and B4).
Lemma 5.10 : Starting from any illegitimate configuration, for every un-
reachable sensor u, it is guaranteed that sensor u is in a d-state and trc.u = 0
within (L + 1) ∗ tmax ∗ rmax time units.
Proof. Every unreachable sensor u is always in a d-state. Therefore, we only
need to show that trc.u becomes 0 within a finite time period. For every node
u0 where there exists no outgoing edge from u0 in graph D, u0 will not receive
any connected message from a node v where there exists edge (u0, v) in graph
D. Thus, it is guaranteed that if trc.u0 > 0, pid.u0 is not an element of P.u0
within tmax ∗ rmax time units, and also pid.u0 cannot be an element of P.u0
from this point. Similar to the proof of Lemma 5.4, we can prove that for
every node u in graph D, it is guaranteed that if trc.u > 0, pid.u is not an
element of P.u within L ∗ tmax ∗ rmax time units, and also pid.u cannot be
an element of P.u from this point. Thus, every node u in graph D will not
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send a connected message, and so will not receive any connected message from
any node in graph D. Also node u cannot receive any connected message
from a node that is not in graph D. Thus, for every node u in graph D, it is
guaranteed that u is in a d-state and trc.u = 0 within (L + 1) ∗ tmax ∗ rmax
time units, if the height of graph D is L.
Theorem 5.4 : (Convergence) Starting from any illegitimate configuration,
the protocol is guaranteed to reach a legitimate configuration within max((K +
1) ∗ tmax ∗ rmax, (L + 1) ∗ tmax ∗ rmax) time units.
Proof. The proof follows from the proofs of Lemmas 5.8, 5.9, and 5.10.
5.6 Simulation and Experimental Results
In this section, we first show the effectiveness of the foster parent ex-
tension by simulation, and then discuss the experimental results of the LGR
protocol.
Simulation results We evaluated the effectiveness of the foster parent ex-
tension by simulation. We considered a sensor network that is configured into
a 10*10 logical grid with a hop size 2. We assumed that a percentage of the
sensors in this network have fail-stopped, and we computed how many of the
remaining sensors are still connected to the routing tree via parents or via
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foster parents, and how many sensors become disconnected from the routing
tree. The results of these simulations are shown in Figures 5.7 and 5.8, and in
Table 5.1, where each result represents the average value over 100 simulations.
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Figure 5.7: Percentage of sensors
that are connected to the tree vs.
percentage of fail-stopped sensors













Figure 5.8: Percentage of sensors
that are disconnected from the tree
vs. percentage of fail-stopped sen-
sors
Table 5.1: Number of fail-stopped sensors vs. Number of connected sensors in
10*10 grid when H=2







The good news from this study is that even if 50% of the sensors in
the network have fail-stopped, about 84% of the remaining sensors remain
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connected to the tree. (Of those, 57% are connected via parents and 27%
are connected via foster parents.) Only 16% of the remaining sensors become
disconnected from the tree. These figures demonstrate that the foster parent
extension is highly effective especially when a large fraction of the sensors in
the network fail-stop.
Experimental results The LGR protocol has been used for the field experi-
ment “A Line in the Sand” [4], where around 100 MICA2 motes were deployed
to monitor a field so that intruders (e.g., tanks, cars, and civilians) can be de-
tected, classified, and tracked. This experiment showed that the LGR protocol
is able to reliably route data messages from every sensor across the network
to the base station and thus provides the foundation for precise target detec-
tion, classification, and tracking. The LGR protocol also has been applied to
the large scale field experiment “ExScal” [7], where about 1000 XSMs (for eX-
treme Scale Motes) and 200 XSSs (for eXtreme Scale Stargates) were deployed
to detect and track intruders. In this experiment, again the LGR protocol has
been able to successfully provide reliable message delivery with the delay less
than 2 seconds.
To study in more depth the property of the LGR protocol in forwarding
packets from different locations, we set up a testbed where 49 MICA2 motes
[1] are deployed in a grass field (see Fig. 5.9(a)), forming a 7*7 grid (see
Fig. 5.9(b)) with a 5-feet separation between neighboring grid points. The
base station (0,0) is the mote at the left-bottom corner of the grid.
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(a) Testbed environment (b) Grid topology
Figure 5.9: The network topology of the testbed
For our experiments, we chose the hop size H to be 2 and T to be 20
seconds. To have a valid logical grid, the power level of each sensor was as-
signed 9 (out of the range 1..255). Based on this setup, we assigned each sensor
in the testbed an identifier so that each sensor can compute the identifiers of
its potential parents by using the algorithm in Section 5.1. In this testbed,
the average number of hops from a sensor to the base station is around 3.3.
In each experiment, we used the traffic trace from the field experiment
“A Line in the Sand” [4] to simulate the network load when events occur. The
traffic trace corresponds to an event where each mote except the base station
generates two data messages whose interval is between 3 and 4.5 seconds, and
overall 96 data messages are generated. The cumulative distribution of the
number of data messages that are generated by the sensors in the network
during the event is shown as Fig. 5.10. Each performance result discussed in
this section represents the average value over 10 runs of this trace.
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Figure 5.10: The traffic distribution
We evaluate the performance of a routing protocol by the following four
metrics:
• Total delivery ratio: the ratio of the total number of unique data mes-
sages received by the base station to the total number of (unique) data
messages generated by all sensors in the network.
• Individual delivery ratio: the ratio of the number of unique data messages
received by the base station from a particular sensor to the number of
data messages generated by that particular sensor.
• Delay : the average time taken for a data message to be received by the
base station after the data message is generated.
• Goodput : the number of unique data messages received by the base sta-
tion divided by the interval between the time the first data message is
generated and the time the last data message is received by the base sta-
tion. Note that the goodput reflects how fast data messages are pushed
from the network to the base station.
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First, we ran experiments of the LGR protocol with the default TinyOS
queue management component “QueuedSend” which simply retransmits a
message up to a certain number of times until the acknowledgment of the
message is received [2]. Fig. 5.11 shows the individual delivery ratio when the
maximum number of per hop retransmissions is 0 (that is, no retransmission).
The individual delivery ratio of each sensor reduces gradually as the number
of hops from a sensor to the base station increases, and the total delivery
ratio is 72%. The LGR protocol provides reliable uniform delivery of data
messages from different locations. This is because the LGR protocol avoids
unreliable links to build a reliable routing tree. Also it balances the load over
the network and avoids causing severe contention or congestion at certain net-
work locations. Table 5.2 also shows the results of the LGR protocol with


















































Figure 5.11: Individual delivery ra-

















































Figure 5.12: Individual delivery ra-
tios of LGR with RBC
To further improve the delivery ratio, we used the LGR protocol with
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Table 5.2: Performance of LGR with QueuedSend
Total delivery ratio Delay Goodput
0 retransmission 72% 0.09 seconds 4.52 messages/second
1 retransmission 77.6% 0.11 seconds 4.83 messages/second
2 retransmission 81% 0.12 seconds 4.82 messages/second
a transport protocol RBC developed in [73]. RBC replicates the acknowl-
edgement for a received message using a window-less block acknowledgement
scheme, and schedules message retransmissions to alleviate contention caused
by them. Thus, lost messages are detected reliably and retransmitted at ap-
propriate time without introducing much additional contention or congestion
to the network. We ran experiments of the LGR protocol with RBC where the
maximum number of per hop retransmissions is 2, and the results are shown
in Fig. 5.12 and Table 5.3. From Fig. 5.12, we observe that the individual
delivery ratio of each sensor is almost 100%, and the total delivery ratio is
98.8%. The delay increases since lost data messages are deferred in retrans-
mission. However, this delay does not decrease the goodput which is more
important to sensor network applications. Moreover, the delay is good enough
for some typical sensor network applications, such as intrusion detection and
tracking [4, 7]. The goodput reaches 6.45 messages/second. Note that the op-
timal goodput for the trace is 6.66 messages/second, when the delay of each
data message is 0 and all the data messages in the trace are received by the
base station.
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Table 5.3: Performance of LGR with RBC
Total delivery ratio Delay Goodput
98.8% 1.2 seconds 6.45 messages/second
5.7 Advantages and Limitations
The LGR protocol has the following advantages (over other routing pro-
tocols in sensor networks): simplicity, load balancing, fast fault recovery, secu-
rity without cryptography, and supporting soft real-time applications. Next,
we discuss each of the advantages of the protocol.
i) Simplicity The LGR protocol is simple and so it consumes a small per-
centage of the network resources (specially compared to traditional distance-
vector routing protocols). In the LGR protocol, each sensor is required to
store no more than 10–15 bytes of routing information that includes P , pid,
and trc, and to send a connected message that has only one message field
every 20 seconds (or less frequently).
ii) Load balancing Each sensor distributes data traffic over all its potential
parents, and so the data items from the same source sensor are likely to follow
different paths to the base station. This feature can also help for sensors to
avoid severe congestion and reduce message collision, when a burst of sensing
events occurs in the network.
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iii) Fast fault recovery When the current parent of a sensor fail-stops, the
sensor will replace this parent as soon as it receives a connected message from
another potential parent. Thus, sensors in the network can recover quickly
from the situation where their parents fail-stop.
iv) Security without cryptography In the distance vector routing pro-
tocol, an adversary sensor i can tempt many sensors to choose i to be their
parents in the routing tree by advertising a very small distance, say 1, to the
base station. The adversary then can drop all the data messages that it re-
ceives from these sensors. However, in the LGR protocol, each sensor has a set
of potential parents in the routing tree and keeps changing its parent when-
ever it receives a connected message from another potential parent. Thus, the
adversary cannot make the sensor choose the adversary to be the parent of the
sensor and then drop all data messages from that sensor, unless all the (legit-
imate) potential parents of the sensor fail-stop. The LGR protocol provides
this security feature without encrypting and decrypting connected messages.
v) Supporting soft real-time applications The LGR protocol inherently
bounds the number of hops that need to be traversed by a data message from
any sensor to the base station. Thus, the delivery delay from any sensor to the
base station can be predicted accurately in many soft real-time applications,
as discussed in [13]. The number of hops C from a sensor (i,j) that has a
parent to the base station is bounded as follows.
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C ≤ max( i
H
	 + j, i +  j
H
	)
On the other hand, the LGR protocol has the following limitations: ini-
tial setup requirement, limited communication patterns, limited connectivity,
and no support for mobility. Next, we discuss each limitation of the protocol.
i) Initial setup requirement The LGR protocol needs to be set up. Each
sensor may need to use GPS or a localization service [36, 61] to compute a
distinct identifier in a logical grid, specially for a large network. Also we
perform off-line experiments to estimate link quality so that we use these
results to identify reliable links. However, once this setup is over, the sensors
can take all the advantages that the LGR protocol provides.
ii) Limited communication patterns The LGR protocol does not sup-
port every communication pattern that can happen in a network. For example,
two sensors in the network cannot exchange data messages unless one of them
is the base station. Nevertheless, the protocol provides the two communication
patterns that are most commonly used by sensor network applications.
iii) Limited connectivity The LGR protocol limits the connectivity of the
sensors in a network such that sensors connected to the tree via foster parents
do not send connected messages. Due to this limitation, some sensor in the
network may not find a path to the base station, even when there is a possible
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path to the base station. However, the probability that this case happens in
the network is very small. We showed in Section 5.4 that even when 50% of
sensors in the network fail-stop, 84% of the sensors still can be connected to
the tree.
iv) No support for mobility The sensors in the logical grid are assigned
distinct identifiers such that their identifiers reflect their physical adjacencies.
This cannot be maintained in mobile environments. However, in most sensor
network applications, the sensors, specially the sensors that participate in
routing, are stationary in the network.
5.8 Related Work
Several experimental studies have been done to understand the nature
of dynamic and lossy wireless sensor networks. Ganesan et al. [25] performed
an experimental study on simple flooding, and reported the complex behavior
of flooding, such as non-uniform flood propagation, long links, and asymmetric
links. Zhao and Govindan [76] investigated packet delivery performance in dif-
ferent indoor and outdoor environments. They showed that a gray area where
reception rate varies dynamically exists over relatively long links, and that the
probability of packet loss changes over different traffic patterns. Similar study
was performed in [14]. They observed that there is no clear correlation be-
tween packet delivery and distance over relatively long links. The link quality
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estimated by periodic beacon exchanges usually reflects the link quality in the
absence of bursty data traffic in sensor networks. Zhang et al. [74] showed that
a link quality changes significantly when the traffic pattern within the network
changes. Thus, it is hard to accurately estimate link quality, especially under
bursty traffic, since different bursts of traffic usually occur sparsely, and each
burst may finish within a short period.
Woo et al. [68] investigated link quality estimation and neighborhood
management in dynamic and lossy sensor networks. They developed a routing
protocol, where each sensor selects a path with the minimal number of re-
transmissions based on the estimated link quality. Seada et al. [60] proposed
link selection strategies based on estimated link quality for geographic routing
protocols. Under bursty traffic, the estimated link quality may not be accurate
and stable, resulting in low message delivery rate.
In geographic routing protocols surveyed in [63], physical location in-
formation is used to route data messages. Each node maintains its one-hop
neighborhood information, and forwards a message to one of its neighbors
that is closer to the destination. As discussed in [60], these protocols can se-
lect unreliable long links to forward a message to the destination. He et al.
[31] proposed a real-time routing protocol that utilizes location information.
To support end-to-end soft real-time communication, each sensor dynamically
estimates single hop delay with all its neighbors, and uses the estimated delay
to select the next hop that satisfies a desired speed. Thus, the delivery delay
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is proportional to the distance between the source and the destination. The
major focus of the LGR protocol is to provide reliable delivery (of bursty data
traffic) to the base station, yet our protocol supports soft real-time applica-
tions using the logical grid structure. The experimental results showed that
the LGR protocol has successfully delivered data messages with acceptable
delay for a tracking application in [4, 7].
Routing protocols were proposed to build virtual coordinates without
location information and route messages based on virtual coordinates [13, 53,
56]. The computation of virtual coordinates is usually based on hop counts
from anchors. In [22], sensors in a network form a layered multi-hop structure
based on hop counts to the base station, and each sensor forwards messages to
one of its neighbors that have a smaller hop count than itself. These protocols
build a routing tree based on hop counts to certain sensors. Therefore, they
take advantage of all long links in sensor networks and they may use unreliable
long links.
A self-stabilizing algorithm was proposed to maintain a spanning tree
in a network [6]. This algorithm requires a pre-specified bound on the network
size, and it is not guaranteed to stabilize within a time period proportional to
the diameter of the network. On the other hand, the LGR protocol stabilizes,
without any prior knowledge of the network size or diameter, within a time
period proportional to the diameter of the network.
The algorithms presented in [8, 11, 26, 44] were designed to localize the
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impact of faults in routing. The LGR protocol does not consider fault contain-
ment, but the mechanisms used by these papers can be applied to the LGR
protocol. Detailed study of this is beyond the scope of our work.
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Chapter 6
Flood Sequencing Protocols in Sensor
Networks
Flood is a communication primitive that can be used by the base station
of a sensor network to send a copy of a message to every sensor in the network.
The execution of a flood starts by the base station sending a message to all
its neighbors. When a sensor receives a message, the sensor needs to check
whether it has received this message for the first time or not. Only if the
sensor has received the message for the first time, the sensor keeps a copy of
the message and may forward the message to all its neighbors. Otherwise, the
sensor discards the message.
To distinguish between “fresh” flood messages that a sensor should keep
and “redundant” flood messages that a sensor should discard, the base station
selects a sequence number and attaches it to a flood message before the base
station broadcasts the message. When a sensor receives a flood message, the
sensor determines based on the sequence number in the received message if
the message is fresh or redundant. The sensor accepts the message if it is
fresh and discards the message if it is redundant. We call a protocol that uses
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sequence numbers to distinguish between fresh flood messages and redundant
flood messages a flood sequencing protocol.
In a flood sequencing protocol, when a fault corrupts the sequence
numbers stored in some sensors in a sensor network, the network can become in
an illegitimate state where the sensors discard fresh flood messages and accept
redundant flood messages. Therefore, a flood sequencing protocol should be
designed such that if the protocol ever reaches an illegitimate state due to some
fault, the protocol is guaranteed to converge back to its legitimate states where
every sensor accepts every fresh flood message and discards every redundant
flood message.
In this chapter, we discuss a family of four flood sequencing protocols.
They are a sequencing free protocol, a linear sequencing protocol, a circular
sequencing protocol, and a differentiated sequencing protocol. We analyze the
stabilization properties of these four protocols. For each of the protocols, we
first compute an upper bound on the convergence time of the protocol from
an illegitimate state to legitimate states. Second, we compute an upper bound
on the number of fresh flood messages that can be discarded by each sensor
during the convergence. Third, we compute an upper bound on the number
of redundant flood messages that can be accepted by each sensor during the
convergence.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 6.1, we
discuss related work and motivation of the flood sequencing protocols. In
Section 6.2, we give an overview of a flood protocol. We present the four flood
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sequencing protocols and analyze their stabilization properties in Sections 6.3,
6.4, 6.5, and 6.6. In Section 6.7, we show the simulation results of these
protocols.
6.1 Motivation
The practice of using sequence numbers to distinguish between fresh
and redundant flood messages has been adopted by most flood protocols in
the literature. In other words, most flood protocols “employ” some flood se-
quencing protocols to distinguish between fresh and redundant flood messages.
A flood sequencing protocol can be designed in various ways, depending on
several design decisions such as how the next sequence number is selected by
the base station, how each sensor determines based on the sequence number
in a received message if the received message is fresh or redundant, and what
information the base station and each sensor stores in its local memory. Un-
fortunately, flood sequencing protocols have so far not been studied well in
the literature. They have been used without full investigation of their design
decisions.
The flood protocols discussed in [25, 45, 57, 64] assume that when a
sensor receives a flood message, the sensor can figure out whether the sensor
has received this message for the first time or not, without specifying any
mechanism to achieve this. In [33, 55], it was suggested to associate a sequence
number with each flood message, but any details on how sequence numbers are
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used by sensors (i.e. the design decisions of their flood sequencing protocols)
were not specified. The flood protocols discussed in [39, 67] propose to attach a
unique identifier to each flood message and make each sensor maintain a list of
identifiers that the sensor has received recently. Similarly, it was suggested in
[65] that each sensor maintains a list of flood messages received by the sensor
recently. However, any details such as how many identifiers or messages each
sensor maintains and when a sensor deletes an identifier or a message from the
list were not discussed.
A flood sequencing protocol is important, since the fault tolerance prop-
erty of a sensor network is affected by a flood sequencing protocol used in the
network. When a fault corrupts the sequence number stored in some sensor in
the network, the sensor may discard fresh flood messages and accept redundant
flood messages. The number of fresh flood messages discarded by the sensor
and the number of redundant flood messages accepted by the sensor, before
the network reaches a legitimate state, are different depending on which flood
sequencing protocol is used in the network or how a flood sequencing protocol
used in the network is designed. Therefore, we need to study various flood
sequencing protocols and analyze the stabilization properties of these proto-
cols. The stabilization properties of the flood sequencing protocols are useful
for sensor network designers or developers to select a proper flood sequencing
protocol that satisfies the needs of a target sensor network.
In practice, a flood sequencing protocol is used with a flood protocol
that may use other techniques to improve the performance of flood such as
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reliability or efficiency. In this chapter, each of the flood sequencing protocols
is described focusing on how sequence numbers are used by sensors, and it is
not described as a specific flood protocol. Note that the stabilization property
of a flood protocol is affected by that of a flood sequencing protocol used in the
flood protocol. If the flood protocol does not maintain any extra state such
that it is based on probability [33, 57], the stabilization property of the flood
protocol is the same as that of the used flood sequencing protocol. If the flood
protocol maintains extra state such that it is based on neighbor information
[46, 64], the stabilization property of the flood protocol also depends on how
the extra state in each sensor is stabilized.
6.2 Overview of a Flood Protocol
In this section, we give an overview of a flood protocol that is used
with our flood sequencing protocols. Consider a network that has n sensors.
In this network, sensor 0 is the base station and can initiate floods over the
network. To initiate the flood of a message, sensor 0 sends a message of the
form data(hmax), where hmax is the maximum number of hops to be made
by this data message in the network.
If sensor 0 initiates one flood and shortly after initiates another flood,
some forwarded messages from these two floods can collide with one another
causing many sensors in the network not to receive the message of either flood,
or (even worse) not to receive the messages of both floods.
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To prevent message collision across consecutive flood messages, once
sensor 0 broadcasts a message, it needs to wait enough time until this message
is no longer forwarded in the network, before broadcasting the next message.
The time period that sensor 0 needs to wait after broadcasting a message and
before broadcasting the next message is called the flood period. The flood
period consists of f time units. (A lower bound on the value of f is computed
below.) Thus, after sensor 0 broadcasts a message, it sets its timeout to expire
after f time units in order to broadcast the next message.
When a sensor receives a data(h) message, the sensor decides whether
the sensor accepts the message and forwards it as a data(h − 1) message,
provided h > 1. To reduce the probability of message collision, any sensor u,
that decides to forward a message, chooses a random period whose length is
chosen uniformly from the range 1..tmax, and sets its timeout to expire after
the chosen random period, so that u can forward the received message at the
end of the random period. This random time period is called the forwarding
period.
Next, we compute the lower bound of the flood period f .
Theorem 6.0:
f ≥ (hmax − 1) ∗ tmax + 1
Proof. When sensor 0 broadcasts a data(hmax) message at time t, an out-
neighbor u of sensor 0 can receive the message at t and choose the maximum
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possible value tmax for the forwarding period. At time t + tmax, u forwards
the message as data(hmax − 1). Similarly, an out-neighbor u′ of sensor u
can receive the message at t + tmax and choose tmax for the forwarding
period. This forwarding process continues until this message makes hmax
hops. Therefore, some sensor u can receive the last data(1) message at time
t + (hmax − 1) ∗ tmax in the worst case. Thus, the flood period needs to
be at least (hmax − 1) ∗ tmax + 1 time units to guarantee that no forwarded
messages from two consecutive floods collide with one anther.
To analyze each of the four flood sequencing protocols, we use the
following value for the flood period f .
f = hmax ∗ tmax + 1
(We choose this value for f , instead of the minimum value (hmax−1)∗tmax+1,
to keep our proofs of the stabilization properties simple.)
Note that the above flood period is computed to guarantee that no two
consecutive flood messages ever collide with each other. In a typical execution
of the protocol, each sensor chooses its forwarding period at random in the
range 1..tmax, and so most sensors likely receive the flood messages within
(hmax − 1) ∗ tmax/2 time units, instead of (hmax − 1) ∗ tmax time units.
Therefore, the half (or even less) of the flood period may be used without
significantly degrading the stabilization property and performance of a flood
sequencing protocol.
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6.3 First Protocol: Sequencing Free
In this section, we discuss a first flood sequencing protocol where no
sequence number is attached to each flood message, and so a sensor cannot
distinguish between fresh and redundant flood messages, resulting that the
sensor accepts every received message. This protocol is called the sequencing
free protocol.
To initiate the flood of a new message, sensor 0 sends a data(hmax)
message, and then sets its timeout to expire after f time units to broadcast
the next message. A formal specification of sensor 0 is given in Fig. 6.1. Note
that sensor 0 does not receive any messages.
1: sensor 0 {base station}
2: const hmax : integer, {max hop count}
3: f : integer {flood period}
4: begin




Figure 6.1: A specification of sensor 0 in the sequencing free protocol
Each sensor u that is not sensor 0 maintains a variable called new. The
value of new is true only when u is in the forwarding period (i.e. u has a flood
message that has been received earlier but has not been forwarded yet). When
sensor u receives a data(h) message, u always accepts the message. Sensor u
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forwards the message as data(h − 1), if h > 1 in the received message and
new = false in u. A formal specification of sensor u is given in Fig. 6.2.
(Each sensor u also maintains a received data message that u will forward
later, even though this is not explicitly specified in the specification.)
1: sensor u:1 .. n − 1
2: const hmax : integer, {max hop count}
3: tmax : integer {max forwarding period}
4: var h,hlast : 1 .. hmax, {rcvd,last hop count}
5: new : boolean {true if u has msg to forward}
6: begin
7: timeout-expires → if new → new := false;
8: send data(hlast)
9: [] ¬ new → skip
10: fi; timeout-after random(1,tmax)
11: [] rcv data(h) → {accept msg}
12: if h>1 ∧ ¬ new → new := true;
13: hlast := h − 1
14: [] h≤ 1 ∨ new → skip
15: fi
16: end
Figure 6.2: A specification of sensor u in the sequencing free protocol
Note that in all the flood sequencing protocols presented in this chapter,
the value of timer.0 is at most f time units, and the value of timer.u is at most
tmax. This is maintained by the executions of all the protocols.
A state S of the sequencing free protocol is legitimate iff either S is a
state where the predicate
(timer.0= 1) ∧ (for all u, u = 0, new.u=false)
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holds or S is a state that is reachable from a state, where this predicate holds,
by some execution of the protocol.
It follows from this definition that if the protocol is executed starting
from a legitimate state, then every time sensor 0 initiates a new flood, previous
flood messages (whether initiated by sensor 0 legitimately or other sensors
illegitimately due to some fault) are no longer forwarded in the network.
The stabilization property of the sequencing free protocol can be stated
by the following three theorems. Theorem 6.1A gives an upper bound on the
convergence time of the protocol from an illegitimate state to legitimate states.
Theorem 6.1B gives an upper bound on the number of fresh messages that can
be discarded by each sensor during the convergence. Theorem 6.1C gives an
upper bound on the number of redundant messages that can be accepted by
each sensor during the convergence. (In general, the stabilization property of
each of the other three protocols can be stated by three theorems: Theorem
6.iA, Theorem 6.iB, and Theorem 6.iC, where i=2,3, and 4.) In proofs be-
low, we use the notation <var>.u to denote the value of variable <var> in a
sensor u.
Theorem 6.1A: In the sequencing free protocol, starting from any illegiti-
mate state, the protocol reaches a legitimate state within 2 ∗ f time units, and
continues to execute within legitimate states.
Proof. (Sketch) Starting from any state, any flood initiated by some sensor u
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due to wrong initial values of new and hlast in u will be terminated within
f time units. This is because sensor u will timeout within tmax time units,
and the maximum lifetime of a flood message is (hmax−1)∗ tmax time units.
After all wrongly initiated floods are terminiated, new.u for every sensor u
always becomes false when timer.u=1. The value of timer.0 becomes 1 again
within 2 ∗ f time units. Thus, the protocol reaches a legitimate state within
2 ∗ f time units, and continuously stays in legitimate states.
Theorem 6.1B: In the sequencing free protocol, starting from any illegit-
imate state, every sensor discards no fresh message (before the protocol con-
verges to a legitimate state).
Note that starting from any legitimate state, every sensor discards no
fresh message, since the sensor accepts every received message.
Theorem 6.1C: In the sequencing free protocol, starting from any illegiti-
mate state, every sensor accepts at most 2 ∗ f redundant messages (before the
protocol converges to a legitimate state).
Proof. A sensor u can receive at most one message at each time instant. Thus,
in the worst case, u can accept a redundant message at each time instant during
the convergence time, and so the maximum number of redundant messages
accepted by u until convergence is 2 ∗ f .
Note that even starting from any legitiamte state, the sensor cannot
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distinguish between fresh and redundant flood messages. The number of re-
dundant copies of the same message accepted by a sensor u depends on the
value of hmax and the network topology. In worst case, u can accept a redun-
dant copy of the same message at each time instant during the flood period
of the message. Thus, starting from any legitimate state, every sensor accepts
at most f redundant copies of the same message.
6.4 Second Protocol: Linear Sequencing
In this section, we discuss a second flood sequencing protocol where
each flood message carries a unique sequence number that is linearly increased,
and so a sensor accepts a flood message that has a sequence number larger
than the last sequence number accepted by the sensor. This protocol is called
the linear sequencing protocol.
1: sensor 0 {base station}
2: const hmax : integer, {max hop count}
3: f : integer {flood period}
4: var slast : integer {last seq number}
5: begin
6: timeout-expires → {generate new msg}




Figure 6.3: A specification of sensor 0 in the linear sequencing protocol
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Each flood message in this protocol is of the form data(h,s), where field
h is the remaining number of hops to be made by this message, and field s is
the unique sequence number of this message.
Whenever sensor 0 broadcasts a new message, sensor 0 increases the
sequence number of the last message by one, and attaches the increased se-
quence number to the message. A formal specification of sensor 0 is given in
Fig. 6.3.
Each sensor u that is not sensor 0 keeps track of the last sequence
number accepted by u in a variable called slast. When sensor u receives a
data(h, s) message, sensor u accepts the message if s > slast, and forwards
the message if h > 1. A formal specification of sensor u is given in Fig. 6.4.
A state S of the linear sequencing protocol is legitimate iff either S is
a state where the predicate
(timer.0= 1) ∧ (for all u, u = 0, new.u=false ∧ slast.u ≤ slast.0)
holds or S is a state that is reachable from a state, where this predicate holds,
by some execution of the protocol.
It follows from this definition that if the protocol is executed starting
from a legitimate state, then every time sensor 0 initiates a new flood, previous
flood messages are no longer forwarded in the network, and the new flood
message has a sequence number that is larger than every slast.u in the network,
so that every u accepts the message.
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1: sensor u:1 .. n − 1
2: const hmax : integer, {max hop count}
3: tmax : integer {max forwarding period}
4: var h,hlast : 1 .. hmax, {rcvd,last hop count}
5: s, slast : integer, {rcvd,last seq number}
6: new : boolean {true if u has msg to forward}
7: begin
8: timeout-expires → if new → new := false;
9: send data(hlast, slast)
10: [] ¬ new → skip
11: fi; timeout-after random(1,tmax)
12: [] rcv data(h, s) → if s > slast → {accept msg} slast := s;
13: if h>1 → new := true;
14: hlast := h − 1
15: [] h≤ 1 → skip
16: fi
17: [] s ≤ slast → {discard msg} skip
18: fi
19: end
Figure 6.4: A specification of sensor u in the linear sequencing protocol
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Let k be the maximum value between 1 and k′, where k′ is the maximum
difference slast.u − slast.0 for any sensor u in the network at an initial state.
Note that the value of k is finite but it is unbounded.
Theorem 6.2A: In the linear sequencing protocol, starting from any ille-
gitimate state, the protocol reaches a legitimate state within (k + 1) ∗ f time
units, and continues to execute within legitimate states.
Proof. (Sketch) There are two cases to consider. In the first case, initially
slast.0 is larger than or equal to each slast.u in the network, so that k′ < 1
and k = 1. In the second case, initially slast.0 is less than some slast.u in the
network, so that k′ ≥ 1 and k ≥ 1. In the first case of k′ < 1 and k = 1, the
proof is similar to that of Theorem 6.1A. The protocol reaches a legitimate
state within 2 ∗ f time units. Consider the second case of k′ ≥ 1 and k ≥ 1.
Let s be the value of slast.0 at the initial state. After f time units, new.u
for every sensor u always becomes false when timer.0=1. When the value of
timer.0 becomes 1 again, say in time unit (t − 1,t), within 2 ∗ f time units,
slast.0 is at least s + 1. Sensor 0 broadcasts a message with sequence number
s+2 at t. If k′ = 1, then s+2 is larger than each slast.u in the network. Thus,
in this case, the protocol reaches a legitimate state within 2 ∗ f time units.
If k′ > 1, then sensor 0 broadcasts a message with sequence number s + 3 at
t + f and so on. Finally at t + (k − 2) ∗ f , sensor 0 broadcasts a message with
sequence number s + k and the flood of this message will be terminated by
t + (k− 1) ∗ f . Thus, the protocol reaches a legitimate state within (k + 1) ∗ f
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time units, and continuously stays in legitimate states.
Theorem 6.2B: In the linear sequencing protocol, starting from any illegit-
imate state, every sensor discards at most (k + 1) ∗ f fresh messages (before
the protocol converges to a legitimate state).
Theorem 6.2C: In the linear sequencing protocol, starting from any ille-
gitimate state, every sensor accepts at most n− 1 redundant messages (before
the protocol converges to a legitimate state).
Proof. (Sketch) Assume that the protocol starts from a state where new.u for
every sensor u is true. In this case, every sensor u can initiate a flood of the
previous accepted message. Thus, sensor u can accept at most n−1 redundant
messages from every other sensor in the network.
The linear sequencing protocol requires sensors to use unbounded se-
quence numbers. Thus, this protocol is very expensive to implement for sensor
networks that have limited resources. However, once the protocol starts its
execution from any legitimate state, every sensor accepts every fresh message
and discards every redundant message under any degree of message loss.
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6.5 Third Protocol: Circular Sequencing
In this section, we discuss a third flood sequencing protocol where each
flood message carries a sequence number that is circularly increased within a
limited range, and so a sensor accepts a flood message that has a sequence
number “logically” larger than the last sequence number accepted by the sen-
sor. This protocol is called the circular sequencing protocol.
Each flood message is augmented with a sequence number that has a
value in the range 0 .. smax, where smax > 1. We assume that smax is an
even number (to keep our presentation simple).
Whenever sensor 0 broadcasts a new message, sensor 0 increases the
sequence number of the last message by one circularly within the range 0
.. smax, and attaches the increased sequence number to the message. The
timeout action of sensor 0 in this protocol is modified as Fig. 6.5.
1: timeout-expires → {generate new msg}
2: slast := (slast + 1) mod (smax+1);
3: send data(hmax,slast);
4: timeout-after f
Figure 6.5: Timeout action of sensor u in the circular sequencing protocol
From the viewpoint of each sequence number s in the range 0 .. smax,
the range can be divided into two subranges, where one subrange consists
of the sequence numbers that are logically “smaller” than s, and the other
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subrange consists of the sequence numbers that are logically “larger” than
s. Thus, sequence number s has smax
2
numbers logically smaller than it and
smax
2
numbers logically larger than it. For example, if smax = 8, number 0 is
logically smaller than 1, 2, 3, and 4, and is logically larger than 5, 6, 7, and 8.
When a sensor u receives a data(h, s) message, sensor u checks if s
is logically larger than slast. Sensor u calls the function “Larger(s, slast)”
that returns true if s is logically larger than slast, and otherwise returns false.
Sensor u accepts the message if Larger(s, slast) returns true, and forwards it
if h > 1. The timeout action of sensor u is identical to the one in the linear
sequencing protocol in Fig. 6.4, and the receiving action of sensor u is modified
as Fig. 6.6.
1: [] rcv data(h, s) →
2: if Larger(s,slast) → {accept msg} slast := s;
3: if h>1 → new := true;
4: hlast := h − 1
5: [] h≤ 1 → skip
6: fi
7: [] ¬Larger(s,slast) → {discard msg} skip
8: fi
Figure 6.6: Receiving action of sensor u in the circualr sequencing protocol
To prove the stabilization property of the circular sequencing protocol,
we make an assumption of bounded message loss as follows:




consecutive flood messages, then every sensor in the network re-
ceives at least one of those flood messages.
Two explanations concerning the above assumption are in order. First,
the protocol may not be self-stabilizing without any bound on message loss.
For example, consider a scenario where smax=8. Assume that sensor 0 sends
a flood message with sequence number 0 and a sensor u accepts the mes-
sage. If sensor u does not receive the next 4 (i.e. smax
2
) consecutive messages
with sequence numbers 1, 2, 3 and 4, and later receives a fresh message with
sequence number 5, it discards the message since sequence number 5 is not
logically larger than sequence number 0. Sensor u also discards the next flood
messages with sequence numbers 6, 7, 8, and 0, if it receives them. In this sce-
nario, if sensor u does not receive the flood messages with sequence numbers
1, 2, 3 and 4, it keeps discarding fresh flood messages. Thus, some assump-
tion of bounded message loss is necessary for the stabilization property of the
protocol.
Second, the above assumption becomes acceptable if the value of smax
is reasonably large enough for a given network setting. Selecting an appropri-
ate value for smax depends on the size of the network, the topology of the
network, and a flood sequencing protocol used in the network. (In Section 6.7,
we show how different values are selected for smax depending on these factors.)
A state S of the circular sequencing protocol is legitimate iff either S
is a state where the predicate
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(timer.0=1) ∧
(for all u, u = 0,
(new.u=false) ∧
(slast.u = slast.0 ∨







(sensor 0 has already initiated at least smax
2
+ 2 floods)
holds or S is a state that is reachable from a state, where this predicate holds,
by some execution of the protocol.
It follows from this definition that if the protocol is executed starting
from a legitimate state, then every time sensor 0 initiates a new flood, previous
flood messages are no longer forwarded in the network, and the new flood
message has a sequence number that is logically larger than every slast.u in
the network, so that every u accepts the message.
Theorem 6.3A: In the circular sequencing protocol, starting from any il-
legitimate state, the protocol reaches a legitimate state within (smax + 2) ∗ f
time units, and continues to execute within legitimate states.
Proof. (Sketch) After f time units, new.u for every sensor u always becomes
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false when timer.0=1. The value of timer.0 becomes 1 again, say in (t − 1, t)
time unit, within 2∗f time units, and then sensor 0 broadcasts a flood message
at t. By the assumption of bounded message loss, every sensor u is guranteed
to receive at least one (fresh) flood message by t + smax
2
∗ f . When u receives
a message, u computes whether the message is fresh or redundant based on
the values of the received sequence number and slast.u. Because of message
loss and/or wrong initial value of slast.u, u may compute that the received
message is redundant. Assume that in (t+ smax
2
∗f −1, t+ smax
2
∗f), the value
of slast.0 is s and the value of slast.u for some sensor u is equal to (s + smax
2
)
mod (smax+1). At t + (smax − 1) ∗ f , sensor 0 broadcasts a message with
sequence number (s + smax
2
) mod (smax+1), and this flood message will be
terminated by t+ smax ∗ f . Therefore, the protocol reaches a legitimate state
within (smax+2)∗f time units, and continuouly stays in legitimate states.
Theorem 6.3B: In the circular sequencing protocol, starting from any il-
legitimate state, every sensor discards at most (smax + 2) ∗ f fresh messages
(before the protocol converges to a legitimate state).
Theorem 6.3C: In the circular sequencing protocol, starting from any ille-
gitimate state, every sensor accepts at most f + 1 redundant messages (before
the protocol converges to a legitimate state).
Proof. (Sketch) During the first f time units, any flood initiated by some
sensor u due to wrong initial values of new and hlast in u can exist in the
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network, and sensor u can accept at most f redundant messages. After f time
units, sensor u can accept one redundant message initiated by sensor 0, and
then u will not accept any redundant message any more. Thus, the maximum
number of redundant messages accepted by sensor u is f + 1.
Note that starting from any legitimate state, every sensor accepts every
fresh message and discards every redundant message under the assumption of
bounded message loss.
6.6 Fourth Protocol: Differentiated Sequencing
In this section, we discuss the last flood sequencing protocol where
the sequence numbers of flood messages are in a limited range, similar to the
circular sequencing protocol. However, in this protocol, a sensor accepts a
flood message if the sequence number of the message is different from the
last sequence number accepted by the sensor. This protocol is called the
differentiated sequencing protocol.
Each flood message is augmented with a sequence number that has a
value in the range 0 .. smax, where smax > 0. We assume that smax is an
even number (to keep our presentation simple).
Sensor 0 in this protocol is identical to the one in the circular sequencing
protocol in Section 6.5, and so we do not need to specify sensor 0 in this section.
When a sensor u receives a data(h, s) message, sensor u accepts the
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message if s is different from slast, and forwards the message if h > 1. The
receiving action of sensor u is modified as Fig. 6.7.
1: [] rcv data(h, s) → if s = slast → {accept msg} slast := s;
2: if h>1 → new := true;
3: hlast := h − 1
4: [] h≤ 1 → skip
5: fi
6: [] s = slast → {discard msg} skip
7: fi
Figure 6.7: Receiving action of sensor u in the differentiated sequencing pro-
tocol
Similar to the circular sequencing protocol, if a sensor does not receive
a large number of consecutive flood messages, the differentiated sequencing
protocol may not be self-stabilizing. Thus, the proofs of the stabilization
property of this protocol are based on the assumption of bounded message
loss described in Section 6.5.
A state S of the differentiated sequencing protocol is legitimate iff either
S is a state where the predicate
(timer.0=1) ∧
(for all u, u = 0,
(new.u=false) ∧
(slast.u = slast.0 ∨
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holds or S is a state that is reachable from a state, where this predicate holds,
by some execution of the protocol.
It follows from this definition that if the protocol is executed starting
from a legitimate state, then every time sensor 0 initiates a new flood, previous
flood messages are no longer forwarded in the network, and the new flood
message has a sequence number that is different from every slast.u in the
network, so that every u accepts the message.
Theorem 6.4A: In the differentiated sequencing protocol, starting from any
illegitimate state, the protocol reaches a legitimate state within ( smax
2
+ 2) ∗ f
time units, and continues to execute within legitimate states.
Proof. (Sketch) After f time units, new.u for every sensor u always becomes
false when timer.0=1. The value of timer.0 becomes 1 again, say in time unit
(t−1,t), within 2∗f time units. Assume that sensor 0 broadcasts a new message
with sequence number s at t. Then, sensor 0 broadcasts a new message with
sequence nubmer (s + smax
2
− 1) mod (smax+1) at t + ( smax
2
− 1) ∗ f . In time
unit (t + smax
2
∗ f − 1,t + smax
2




− 1) mod (smax+1), since u receives at least one of those sequence
numbers by the assumption of bounded message loss. Thus, the protocol
reaches a legitimate state within (smax
2
+ 2) ∗ f time units, and continuously
stays in legitimate states.
Theorem 6.4B: In the differentiated sequencing protocol, starting from any
illegitimate state, every sensor discards at most ( smax
2
+ 2) ∗ f fresh messages
(before the protocol converges to a legitimate state).
Theorem 6.4C: In the differentiated sequencing protocol, starting from
any illegitimate state, every sensor accepts at most f + 1 redundant messages
(before the protocol converges to a legitimate state).
Note that starting from any legitimate state, every sensor accepts every
fresh message and discards every redundnat message under the assumption of
bounded message loss.
Table 6.1: Stabilization Properties of the Flood Sequencing Protocols
Convergence time Max # of fresh Max # of redundant Stabilization
(time units) msgs discarded by msg accepted by property
u until convergence u until convergence
free 2 ∗ f 0 2 ∗ f good
lin unbounded unbounded n − 1 bad
cir (smax + 2) ∗ f (smax + 2) ∗ f f + 1 good
dif (smax2 + 2) ∗ f (smax2 + 2) ∗ f f + 1 good
We compare the stabilization properties of the four flood sequencing
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Table 6.2: Stable Properties of the Flood Sequencing Protocols
Max # of fresh msgs Max # of redundant copies of Stable
discarded by u the same msg accepted by property
after convergence u after convergence
free 0 f bad
lin 0 0 good
cir 0 0 good
dif 0 0 good
protocols in Table 6.1. We also compare the properties of the flood sequencing
protocols after convergence (or starting from a legitimate state) in Table 6.2.
We call these properties the stable properties of the protocols. In Tables 6.1
and 6.2, “free”, “lin”, “cir”, and “dif” represent the sequencing free, linear
sequencing, circular sequencing, and differentiated sequencing protocols, re-
spectively. We conclude that the differentiated sequencing protocol has better
stabilization property than those of the other three protocols.
6.7 Simulation Results
We have developed a simulator that can simulate the execution of the
four flood sequencing protocols. In this simulator, a network is an N ∗N grid
where N is the number of sensors in each side of the grid, and the distance
between a sensor (i, j) and each of (i + 1, j), (i, j + 1), (i− 1, j), and (i, j − 1),
if it exists, where 0 ≤ i, j < N , is 1.
For the purpose of simulation, sensor 0 is (0,0) which is located at the
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left-bottom conner in a grid, and the following two types of topologies that
have different network density were used.
• A topology for a sparse network:
The edge probability between two sensors is labeled with probability 0.95
(i.e. a strong edge as discussed in Chapter 2) if their distance is at most
1, and with probability 0.5 (i.e. a weak edge as discussed in Chapter 2)
if their distance is larger than 1 and less than 2. Otherwise, there is no
edge between the two sensors. In this topology, each sensor (i,j) that is
not on or near the boundary of the grid generally has 8 neighbors.
• A topology for a dense network:
The edge probability between two sensors is labeled with probability 0.95
if their distance is at most 1.5, and with probability 0.5 if their distance
is larger than 1.5 and less than 3. Otherwise, there is no edge between
the two sensors. In this topology, each sensor (i,j) that is not on or near
the boundary of the grid generally has 24 neighbors.
The performance of a flood sequencing protocol can be measured by
the following two metrics:
i. Reach: The percentage of sensors that receive a message sent
by sensor 0.
ii. Communication: The total number of messages forwarded by
all sensors in the network.
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We ran simulations of the four flood sequencing protocols, and mea-
sured the above two metrics in 10*10 and 20*20 grids for both sparse and
dense network topologies. (In the figures and tables below,“free”, “lin”, “cir”,
and “dif” represent the sequencing free, linear sequencing, circular sequenc-
ing, and differentiated sequencing protocols, respectively.) In our simulations,
we do not consider other techniques that can improve the performance of a
flood protocol based on extra information such as probability, location, and
neighbor information.
First, we studied the performance of the sequencing free protocol and
the linear sequencing protocol starting from a legitimate state. The result of
each simulation in this study represents the average value over the simulations
of 100,000 floods. Staring from a legitimate state, the linear sequencing proto-
col never discards fresh messages and never accepts redundant messages under
any degree of message loss, and so we consider its performance as the ideal
one for flood sequencing protocols that attach a sequence number to a flood
message. Note that when the value of smax is reasonably large for a given
network setting, the performance of the circular sequencing and differentiated
sequencing protocols becomes same as that of the linear sequencing protocol.
Tables 6.3 and 6.4 show the reach and communication of the sequencing
free protocol and the linear sequencing protocol in a sparse network and in a
dense network, respectively. Also the value of hmax used in each network
setting is specified in these tables. In these simulations, tmax = 6 was used
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Table 6.3: Sequencing free and linear sequencing protocols in a sparse network
A 10*10 network A 20*20 network
hmax Reach Comm. hmax Reach Comm.
free 13 99% 351.3 27 99.2% 2885.7
lin 15 98.5% 97.8 28 98.5% 390.3
Table 6.4: Sequencing free and linear sequencing protocols in a dense network
A 10*10 network A 20*20 network
hmax Reach Comm. hmax Reach Comm.
free 7 99.8% 200.5 13 99% 1262
lin 7 98.5% 87.5 14 98.8% 376.4
for a sparse network, and tmax = 7 was used for a dense network. From
the above results, one can observe that the sequencing free protocol requires
the sensors to send much more messages than those that the linear sequencing
protocol does. Specially in a sparse 20*20 network where a large value needs to
be selected for hmax (i.e. hmax = 27), the communication of the sequencing
free protocol is around 7.39 times that of the linear sequencing protocol.
Next, we studied the stabilization properties of the circular sequenc-
ing and differentiated sequencing protocols, and their performance while sta-
bilizing. We simulated the sequences of floods starting from 1000 different
illegitimate states, and computed the average reach for each i-th flood. We
attempted to select an appropriate value of smax for each network setting
such that the assumption of bounded message loss becomes acceptable, while
the convergence time of each protocol is minimized.
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(a) A 10*10 network
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(b) A 20*20 network
Figure 6.8: Reach of circular and differentiated sequencing protocols starting
from an illegitimate state in a sparse network










(a) A 10*10 network










(b) A 20*20 network
Figure 6.9: Reach of circular and differentiated sequencing protocols starting
from an illegitimate state in a dense network
131
Figures 6.8 and 6.9 show the reach of the circular sequencing and dif-
ferentiated sequencing protocols starting from an illegitimate state in a sparse
network and in a dense network, respectively. From these results, one can
observe the followings for the circular sequencing protocol. For a sparse net-
work, a large value needs to be selected for smax such as hmax = 18 in a
10*10 network and hmax = 34 in a 20*20 network. Also the size of a network
affects selecting a value for smax. On the contrary, for a dense network, a
relatively small value can be selected for smax, regardless of a network size
(whether 10*10 or 20*20). During the convergence time, each sensor has a
higher probability to receive a (fresh) flood message from one of its neighbors
in a dense network than that in a sparse network, since the number of its
neighbors in a dense network is larger than that in a sparse network. Thus,
this protocol converges faster to a legitimate state in a dense network than in
a sparse network.
In the differentiated sequencing protocol, a small value can be selected
for smax, regardless of a network size (whether 10*10 or 20*20) in both sparse
and dense networks. During the convergence time, each sensor has a higher
probability to accept a received fresh message in the differentiated sequencing
protocol (where it accepts a message if the message has a different sequence
number than its last sequence number) than that in the circular sequencing
protocol (where it accepts a message if the message has a logically larger
sequence number than its last sequence number). Thus, this protocol generally
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reaches a legitimate state faster than the circular sequencing protocol does.
In summary, starting from a legitimate state, the performance of any
flood sequencing protocol that attaches a sequence number to a flood message
is better than that of the sequencing free protocol in terms of communication.
Starting from an illegitimate state, the differentiated sequencing protocol con-
verges to a legitimate state quickly in all simulated network settings. Thus,
we conclude that the differentiated sequencing protocol has better stabiliza-





In this dissertation, we studied a systematic approach to design and an-
alyze self-stabilizing sensor protocols. A self-stabilizing protocol is guaranteed
to return to a state where it performs its intended function correctly, when
some dynamic factors or faults corrupt the state of the protocol arbitrarily.
Thus, self-stabilization is highly desirable for sensor networks that suffer from
various dynamic factors and faults. In this section, we first summarize our
contributions, and then discuss future research work.
As the first step towards designing and analyzing self-stabilizing sensor
protocols, we developed a state-based model of sensor protocols that can be
used to formally specify sensor protocols. This model accommodates several
unique characteristics of sensor networks such as unavoidable local broadcast,
probabilistic message transmission, asymmetric communication, message col-
lision, and timeout actions and randomization steps. These characteristics
should be taken into account when one designs or analyzes self-stabilizing sen-
sor protocols.
For verifying and analyzing the correctness and self-stabilization prop-
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erties of sensor protocols specified in our detailed model, we proposed three
analysis methods based on different assumptions. In nondeterministic analy-
sis, a sensor protocol is verified under the two assumptions of idealized message
transmission and no message collision. In probabilistic analysis, the protocol is
analyzed under the relaxation of the first assumption. In collision analysis, the
protocol is analyzed under the relaxation of the first and second assumptions.
Using our state-based model and analysis methods, we designed and
analyzed three interesting self-stabilizing sensor protocols, the sentry-sleeper
protocol, the logical grid routing protocol, and a family of the four flood se-
quencing protocols. For each of these protocols, we formally specified the
protocol, verified its self-stabilization property, and studied its performance
by simulations or experiments.
The state-based model and analysis methods proposed in this disser-
tation can be also used to design and analyze many sensor protocols that
require other desirable properties, such as time-related, energy-related, safety,
progress, and security properties. For example, the lifetime of a group of
sensors was analyzed based on our model in Chapter 4.
Next, we discuss future research work. The verification and analysis
process of a sensor protocol is still hard. In Chapter 3, the nondeterminis-
tic and probabilistic state transition diagrams of the neighbor computation
protocol were generated by our thorough inspection about the protocol be-
havior. We need to investigate how to automate or facilitate this verification
and analysis process. An algorithm or tool that generates a (nondeterministic
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and probabilistic) state transition diagram automatically from a protocol spec-
ification will facilitate the nondeterministic and probabilistic analyses of the
protocol. Also a simulator that generates executable codes automatically from
a protocol specification will facilitate the collision analysis of the protocol.
In practice, the presented self-stabilizing sensor protocols can be used
with other protocols or techniques to improve the performance of a sensor
network. For example, energy saving techniques, such as [15, 37], can be in-
corporated with the logical grid routing protocol to allow some sensors in the
network to sleep dynamically. We can investigate how the self-stabilization
properties of the protocols are affected by other protocols or techniques, when
they are incorporated with the protocols.
In a sensor network, multiple applications that may employ different
middleware protocols can be deployed to increase the utility of the network.
In this case, the multiple applications and employed middleware protocols
need to compete with each other for the limited resources of the network,
making the network hard to predict its performance. We can develop self-
managing systems that make multiple applications and middleware protocols
react to dynamic changes in environment and improve the predictability on
the performance of the network.
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